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L Introduction
This year marks the twentieth anniversary of three important cases on
federal summary judgment. Known as the "trilogy,"1 Matsushita Electric
Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,3 and
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett4 have had a profound impact on federal litigation.
Federal courts have cited these three cases more than any other U.S. Supreme
Court decisions.5 Collectively, the trilogy is viewed as a "celebration of
1. E.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 206 (1993)
(asserting that these three cases "changed the manner in which courts approach summary
judgment").
2. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
3. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
4. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
5. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency with which
federal courts cite the trilogy cases). If citations by both state and federal courts are counted,
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summary judgment"6 and a mandate for federal courts to embrace the use of
summary judgment to dispose of cases before trial.7 Among the trilogy,
Celotex is widely perceived as the most significant. Martin Redish recently
wrote "[o]f the three, Celotex most clearly altered well-established summary
judgment practice, and in any event, Celotex, far more than the others,
decisively opened the eyes of the federal courts to the propriety of summary
judgment in certain cases.
', 8
Celotex dealt with the most common summary judgment scenario: when
the defendant moves for summary judgment, seeking to win the case without
having to endure a potentially costly and risky trial. Celotex's immediate
impact was to expand the availability of summary judgment as a means for
disposing of a plaintiff s claims prior to trial. In particular, Celotex recognized
that a defendant could obtain summary judgment not only by putting forth
affirmative evidence that the plaintiffs case was meritless, but also by showing
that the plaintiff would lack evidence to prove some essential element of her
claim.9 Celotex also spoke more generally to how burdens are allocated
between the party seeking and the party opposing summary judgment and what
materials may be considered in connection with these burdens.l° To this day,
Celotex provides the Court's most current instructions on these important
questions.
Anderson and Celotex are still the two most frequently cited Supreme Court cases in history,
with Matsushita comfortably in sixth place. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text
(discussing the frequency with which the trilogy cases have been cited by all courts, state and
federal).
6. Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1114-15 (1986).
7. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 ("Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not
as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action."' (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1)). But cf Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the
Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433,474 (1987) (arguing that the trilogy has "further
enfeebled the efficacy of the summary adjudication procedure").
8. Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1348 (2005); see also John E. Kennedy, Federal
Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary
Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. LMG. 227,228 (1987) (calling Celotex the "most important for
procedural purposes"); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary
Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 54 (1988) (calling Celotex "the broadest of the
three cases").
9. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (providing an in-depth discussion of
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Celotex).
10. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (summarizing the main principles
derived from Celotex).
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Anniversaries are times for reflection." Celotex is a significant decision
from both theoretical and practical standpoints. It impacts core questions of
procedural fairness, 12 the proper roles of judges and juries in the federal
system,' 3 the increasing caseloads of the federal judiciary,' 4 and distributive
justice in the federal court system.1 5 It also provides the blueprint for the
basic mechanics of litigating and adjudicating summary judgment motions.'
6
Over the past two decades, Celotex has become the subject of sustained
academic commentary,' 7 as well as a vital part of any first-year civil
11. Cf. David J. Garrow, "Happy" Birthday, Brown v. Board of Education?: Brown's
Fiftieth Anniversary and the New Critics of Supreme Court Muscularity, 90 VA. L. REV. 693,
693 (2004) (reviewing MiCHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)); Patricia M. Wald, Summary
Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897, 1914-17 (1998) (discussing increased use of summary
judgment sixty years after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Jack B.
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are The Barriers to
Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1901 (1989) (discussing the influence of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, their current role, and proposed "reforms" for the Rules fifty
years after their adoption).
12. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.L. REv. 982, 1044-48 (2003) (questioning whether the increased use
of summary judgment following Celotex and the trilogy is worth "negative effects on other
system values, such as accuracy, fairness, the day-in-court principle, and the jury trial right").
13. See id. at 1074-77 (exploring the impact of Rule 56 on the jury trial guarantee);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 162-70 (1988)
(explaining the change in the role and authority of the civil jury).
14. See Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A Proposalfor Procedural
Reform in the Core Motion Context, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1633, 1656-59 (1995)
(discussing federal summary judgment and arguing that Celotex was "an effort by a majority of
the Court to encourage active policing of the docket").
15. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 75 (1990) (noting that the trilogy's effect on summary judgment
practice "results in a wealth transfer from plaintiffs as a class to defendants as a class").
16. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (summarizing the main principles
derived from Celotex).
17. E.g., Redish, supra note 8, at 1333-35, 1342-48, 1355-57 (discussing Celotex); Jack
H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in
Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 770,777-87 (1988) (same); Issacharoff& Loewenstein,
supra note 15, at 78-90, 108-19 (same); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 234-59 (same); Martin B.
Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of
Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1023, 1043-50 (1989) (same); Miller, supra note 12, at 1037-50,
1132-34 (same); Nelken, supra note 8, at 54-85 (same); Sinclair & Hanes, supra note 14, at
1653-63 (same); Stempel, supra note 13, at 99-100, 105-08, 157-63, 189-92 (same); Wald,
supra note 11, at 1907-15, 1941-44 (same). See generally David L. Shapiro, The Story of
Celotex: The Role of Summary Judgment in the Administration of Civil Justice, in CIvIL
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procedure course' 8 or federal courts treatise. 19 While Celotex is a necessary
authority and indispensable guide for the judges who must resolve summary
judgment motions on a day-to-day basis, it remains the subject of conflicting
interpretations by federal trial and appellate courts.2°
The twentieth anniversary of the trilogy provides an important opportunity
to reconsider Celotex and its impact on summary judgment burdens. The
recent passing of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who authored the Celotex
majority opinion as an Associate Justice, makes this a particularly appropriate
time to revisit Celotex. If the empirical evidence is any indication, history will
recognize Celotex as among his most significant contributions. 2' Like many
watershed cases, Celotex raised questions as well as answered them. Although
Celotex appeared to establish an orderly sequence of burdens for the moving
defendant and the nonmoving plaintiff, it left numerous ambiguities concerning
the precise contours of these burdens and what materials may be used to satisfy
them. These unanswered questions have given rise to competing myths about
Celotex and summary judgment burdens. The justifications offered for the
prevailing myths are principally each proponent's policy preferences about how
summary judgment procedure ought to operate in the federal system.
This Article treats Celotex not as an empty vessel for achieving optimal
policy but rather as an object of interpretation. Thus, it takes a more traditional
approach-long overdue in this area-that emphasizes what we customarily
value when interpreting a decision. Specifically, this Article seeks an
interpretation of Celotex that is consistent with prior cases, consistent with the
governing textual sources, and coherent in light of its own factual and
procedural posture. These values may seem simple, but taking them seriously
points toward a fresh approach to summary judgment burdens that is a better
reading of Celotex as a matter of case-interpretation.
By contrast, the prevailing myths of Celotex are not true to these
interpretive values. They assume that Celotex intended to silently contradict
PROCEDURE STORiEs: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE LEADING CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES 343 (Kevin
M. Clermont ed., 2004) (discussing the impact of Celotex).
18. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CiVI. PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 925 (8th ed.
2001) (discussing Celotex); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN
APPROACH 414 (3d ed. 2000) (same).
19. E.g., 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2727
(3d ed. 1998) (discussing Celotex); 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
H 56.03, 56.13 (3d ed. 1997) (same).
20. See infra notes 252-64 and accompanying text (discussing the lower courts'
conflicting interpretations of both defendants' and plaintiffs' burdens under Celotex).
21. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (establishing Celotex as one of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's most significant contributions).
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81 (2006)
what the Supreme Court held sixteen years earlier in Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co. 22 Or they suffer from glaring inconsistencies with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, the textual authority for summary judgment in the federal system.
Or they proffer readings of Celotex that make little sense given the actual
posture of that case. This Article provides-for the first time-an
interpretation of Celotex that is consistent with prior case law, including
Adickes, and with the text of Rule 56. My view also renders the majority
opinion a coherent whole that fits with the case's factual and procedural
posture.
Part H of this Article examines the staggering empirical evidence of the
summary judgment trilogy's influence and argues that Celotex is an important
part of Chief Justice Rehnquist's judicial legacy. Part In describes the history
of summary judgment prior to Celotex. Part IV details the Celotex case in both
the lower courts and the Supreme Court. In addition to summarizing the
Supreme Court's instructions on summary judgment burdens, this Part
identifies important issues that the Celotex majority failed to clarify.
Part V undertakes both a descriptive account and normative critique of the
myths surrounding the Celotex decision. It first articulates three interpretive
values: (1) consistency with prior cases; (2) consistency with the text of the
governing statutes or rules; and (3) internal coherence with the decision itself
and the case's factual and procedural posture. This Part then summarizes and
evaluates the current understandings of Celotex, and describes the conflict in
the lower federal courts about what Celotex requires of litigants. Part VI
proposes a new approach to Celotex that is consistent with past precedent, fits
with the text of Rule 56, and makes sense in light of the factual and procedural
posture of Celotex when it reached the Supreme Court. This Part also explains
how this approach would achieve a reasonable middle ground between the two
most common myths of Celotex and would resolve a long-standing
misperception about the relationship between the Celotex majority opinion and
the concurrence by Justice White. Finally, this Part responds to some likely
critiques of the approach I propose.
II. An Empirical Tribute to the 1986 Trilogy
One measure of a decision's impact and influence is the frequency with
which other courts cite it.23 The empirical evidence of the trilogy's impact is
22. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
23. See Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J.
LEGAL STuD. 333, 334-49 (1998) (using citation as "a proxy for an opinion's value"); William
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impressive indeed. Federal courts cite Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex more
than any decisions ever issued by a federal tribunal.24 Anderson and Celotex
are by far the top-two cases in terms of federal court citations, each with over
70,000.25 Matsushita, cited by over 31,000 federal opinions, is an admittedly
distant third, but it is still more than 3000 citations ahead of Conley v. Gibson,
26
the case with the fourth-highest number of federal court citations.27
Measuring citations by all courts, state and federal, Anderson and Celotex
are still the two most frequently cited Supreme Court cases, again by a
staggering margin.28 Anderson and Celotex each have over 72,000 citations by
federal and state courts. 29 This places them more than 20,000 citations ahead of
Strickland v. Washington,30 the third-most-cited case.3' Matsushita is the sixth-
most-cited case with over 32,000 citations by state and federal courts, more
than 2000 citations ahead of Anders v. California,32 the seventh-most-cited
case.
33
The empirical data also tell us something quite surprising about the legacy
of Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Most posit that Rehnquist's greatest
M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts ofAppeals Judges,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998) (using the number of citations to published opinions to
measure the influence of individual judges); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal
Precedent A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250 (1976) ("Where,
however, the rule has been solidified in a long line of decisions, the authority of the rule is
enhanced."); see also Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the
United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1331, 1332 n.7 (2005) (noting that
"[v]arious types of citation analysis have been used for decades in the legal community to gauge
the impact of books, law review articles, court decisions, or judges, among other things").
24. See infra app. tbl. 1 (ranking cases in terms of most citations by federal courts and
tribunals). The citation counts described in this Part and in the appendix are based on the
Shepard's citation service.
25. Id.
26. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
27. Infra app. tbl.l.
28. See id. tbl.2 (ranking cases in terms of most citations by all courts and tribunals).
29. Id. It is interesting that Anderson and Celotex, which address a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, have so many citations by state courts. One state's highest court explained: "[W]e
are not bound to apply the summary judgment standard articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Celotex. However, we think it makes eminent good sense to do so."
Kourouvacilis v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Mass. 1991) (citations omitted); see
also MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE, ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE § 171.08 (2003) (noting that the
Ohio Supreme Court explicitly adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's Celotex standards).
30. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
31. Infra app. tbl.2.
32. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
33. Infra app. tbl.2.
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legacy will be his decisions on federalism.34 But the empirical evidence
indicates that his most influential contribution during a tenure on the Court
spanning four decades is his majority opinion in Celotex. Cases that are
typically considered Justice Rehnquist's influential federalism decisions-for
example, United States v. Lopez,35 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,6 and
United States v. Morrison37-- each have considerably fewer than 2000 citations
by federal and state courts. 38 While Celotex may have enjoyed a chronological
head-start, a 70,000-citation deficit will be hard to overcome. The data confirm
that any assessment of Chief Justice Rehnquist' s judicial legacy must consider
seriously the profound impact of his Celotex decision on civil litigation.39
III. A Brief History of Summary Judgment
Prior to the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
number of states, as well as England and some British colonies, had adopted
summary judgment procedures. 40 England introduced summary judgment in
1855.41 At the time, England authorized summary judgment only for claims on
bills of exchange and promissory notes.42 Only a plaintiff could seek summary
judgment, as the drafters intended for the procedure to weed out "frivolous or
fictitious Defences." 43 In the United States, several states adopted summary
judgment procedures in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
34. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELLL. REv. 1, 11-13 & n.58 (2003) ("[I]t is a hallmark-and perhaps
the legacy--of the Rehnquist Court to have brought back to the public law table the notion that
the Constitution is a charter for a government of limited and enumerated powers.").
35. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
37. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38. Chief Justice Rehnquist's second-most cited opinion, in all courts and tribunals, is
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which ranks thirtieth overall with approximately 9000
citations. Infra app. tbl.2. Gates is a Fourth Amendment case concerning the exclusionary rule
and the use of confidential informants to obtain a search warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 216.
39. Justice Rehnquist's majority decision in Celotex is described infra notes 109-30 and
accompanying text.
40. See Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J.
423,423 (1929) (listing jurisdictions that had developed summary judgment procedures by the
time the Article was written). See generally id. (providing a history of summary judgment);
Robert W. Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.J. 193
(1928) (same).




including Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Illinois, Michigan and New
York.a" As in England, only plaintiffs could seek summary judgment, and then
only as to particular enumerated claims.45
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In 1938, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.46 Rule 56 authorized either a plaintiff or a
defendant to seek summary judgment.47 The text of Rule 56 has remained
remarkably constant since its initial promulgation. Then, as now, Rule 56(c)
set forth the general standard for granting summary judgment motions:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter
of law.
48
The text of Rule 56(c) provided no further guidance on how courts should
assess whether the documents listed "show that there is no genuine issue [of]
material fact." It thus relied on the courts to develop the details and analytical
structure for adjudicating summary judgment motions.
Rule 56 did, however, impose specific requirements for any affidavits
used to support or oppose summary judgment. Rule 56(e) provided:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
44. Id. at 423.
45. E.g., id. at 440-41 (quoting nine types of actions for which summary judgment could
be sought under CONN. RuLE OF CIVIL PRACTICE § 14(A)(1) as of 1929). As compared to other
summary judgment procedures at the time, Connecticut's was described as "most extensive" in
terms of the types of actions for which it was available. Id. at 423.
46. See Weinstein, supra note 11, at 1901 & nn.1-3 (discussing the history of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
47. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a)-(b).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The quoted material includes the one change that has been
made to this language since its initial promulgation in 1938. The reference to "answers to
interrogatories" was added by a 1963 amendment. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note
(1963 amendment). The advisory committee explained that this phrase had been "inadvertently
omitted" from the rule as initially drafted. Id.
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therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
4 9
Rule 56 did not impose corresponding standards for the other documents listed
in Rule 56(c)-pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions-perhaps because the standards governing these materials were
addressed elsewhere in the Federal Rules.
In certain circumstances, even where the standard for summary judgment
was otherwise met, Rule 56 gave the court discretion to relax Rule 56(c)'s
mandate that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith." Rule 56(f)
provided:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
50
A plaintiff typically uses Rule 56(f) when she is depending on the discovery
process to uncover evidence to support her allegations. If the defendant moves
for summary judgment before the plaintiff has had an opportunity to conduct
discovery, she may invoke Rule 56(f).
B. The 1963 Amendment to Rule 56(e)
In 1963, Rule 56(e) was amended in response to a series of cases that,
according to the Advisory Committee, had "impaired the utility of the summary
judgment device."51 The Committee was concerned with the scenario where a
party supported its motion for summary judgment with affidavits that, if
accepted as true, would establish facts warranting judgment in its favor but the
opposing party presented no evidentiary material sufficient to refute the
movant' s affidavits. 52 A number of Third Circuit cases took the position that
courts should not grant summary judgment in that situation as long as factual
allegations contained in the nonmovant's pleadings refuted the movant's
affidavits.5 3
49. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(e).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note (1963 amendment).
52. See id. (explaining the reason for the amendment).
53. See id. (citing, inter alia, Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580
(3d Cit. 1948); United States ex rel. Kolton v. Halpem, 260 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1958); United
States ex reL Nobles v. Ivey Bros. Constr. Co., 191 F. Supp. 383 (D. Del. 1961)); see, e.g.,
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The Advisory Committee found the Third Circuit's approach
"incompatible with the basic purpose" of summary judgment.54 It explained
that "[t]he very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the
pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine
need for trial."55 In order to "overcome" this line of cases,56 the following
language was added to Rule 56(e):
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against the adverse party.
57
By preventing the nonmoving party from opposing a properly supported
summary judgment motion with "mere allegations or denials" in its pleading,
the 1963 amendment confirmed that a critical function of summaryjudgment
was to look beyond the parties' allegations to the question of whether there
would be evidence to support those allegations. The amendment
"recognize[d] that, despite the best efforts of counsel to make his pleadings
accurate, they may be overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof available to
his adversary.
58
C. The Adickes Case
One of the most significant pre-trilogy summary judgment cases was
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.5 9 In 1964, Sandra Adickes taught at a "Freedom
School" in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.6° Adickes, who was white, and six of
her black students went to have lunch at a store operated by S. H. Kress &
United States ex rel. Nobles, 191 F. Supp. at 384 ("An issue of fact being well pleaded by the
third affirmative defense, I am not aware of any rule or decision requiring the defendant to file
any additional affidavits or to take any other step in the matter.").
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note (1963 amendment).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note (1963 amendment).
59. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co, 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
60. Id. at 146-47.
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Co.6 ' The store refused to serve her, and Hattiesburg police arrested her for
vagrancy after she left.62
Adickes sued Kress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Kress's
refusal to serve her violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.63 In order to prevail on this claim, Adickes had to show that Kress
acted "under color of law."64 On this issue, Adickes presented two theories.
She first contended that Kress refused her service because of a "custom of the
community to segregate the races in public eating places. '65 This theory went
to trial, where the district court directed a verdict for Kress.66 The Supreme
Court ultimately reversed this directed verdict, ordering a new trial on
Adickes's "custom of the community" claim.67
Adickes's second contention-the one more significant in terms of
summary judgment-was that the refusal to serve her was the result of a
conspiracy between Kress and the Hattiesburg police.68 On this claim, the
district court granted summary judgment for Kress.69 In support of its motion,
Kress had submitted the following documents: (a) deposition testimony from
Mr. Powell, the store's manager, stating that he had not communicated with the
police about refusing service to Adickes; (b) affidavits from the chief of police
and the two arresting officers stating that Mr. Powell had not asked them to
arrest Adickes; and (c) deposition testimony from Adickes, stating that she did
not know of any communication between any Kress employee and the
Hattiesburg police.7° In opposing the motion for summary judgment, Adickes
had relied on (a) her own deposition testimony that Carolyn Moncure, one of
her students, had seen a policeman come into the store; and (b) an unsworn
statement by Irene Sullivan, a Kress employee, stating that she had seen a
policeman enter the store while Adickes and her students were there.71
The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, stating that
Kress "failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of
61. Id.
62. Id. at 146.
63. Id. at 147.
64. Id. at 150-52.
65. Id. at 147.
66. Id. at 147-48.
67. Id. at 148, 174.
68. Id. at 148.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 153-55 & nn.8-12.
71. Id. at 156-57 & nn.13-14.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDENS
fact."72 The Court reasoned that " [Kress] did not carry its burden because of its
failure to foreclose the possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store
while petitioner was awaiting service, and that this policeman reached an
understanding with some Kress employee that petitioner not be served. '7 3 As
the Court explained, Mr. Powell's testimony that he had not communicated
with a police officer about refusing to serve Adickes did not foreclose the
possibility that another Kress employee had done so. 74 And the affidavits from
the police officers, which had addressed only the arrest, not the refusal to serve,
did not foreclose the possibility that either of them had been in the store and
had communicated with a Kress employee in a way that influenced the decision
not to serve Adickes. 75 The Court concluded:
[Kress] failed to fulfill its initial burden of demonstrating what is a critical
element in this aspect of the case-that there was no policeman in the store.
If a policeman were present, we think it would be open to a jury, in light of
the sequence that followed, to infer from the circumstances that the
policeman and a Kress employee had a "meeting of the minds" and thus
reached an understanding that petitioner should be refused service.
76
The Court acknowledged that there were problems with the documents Adickes
had submitted in opposition to Kress's motion. Adickes's deposition testimony
that her student Carolyn Moncure had seen a police officer in the store was
hearsay, and the unsworn statement of Irene Sullivan did not comply with Rule
56(e)'s requirements for affidavits.77 Rule 56(c), however, required the party
moving for summary judgment "to show initially the absence of a genuine issue
concerning any material fact. 7 8 Because Kress had failed to meet this initial
burden, there was no need for Adickes "to come forward with suitable opposing
affidavits. 7 9 Nonetheless, the Court stated in dicta that if Kress had met its
initial burden, such as by "submitting affidavits from the policemen denying
their presence in the store," Adickes "would have had to come forward with
either (1) the affidavit of someone who saw the policeman in the store or (2) an
affidavit under Rule 56(f) explaining why at that time it was impractical to do
SO. "
80
72. Id. at 153.
73. Id. at 157.
74. Id. at 157-58.
75. Id. at 155 n.12, 158.
76. Id. at 158.
77. Id. at 159 n.19.
78. Id. at 159.
79. Id. at 160.
80. Id.
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The most significant aspect of Adickes for summary judgment burdens
was the conclusion that Kress had failed to meet its burden because its
supporting documents did not "foreclose the possibility" of a conspiracy
between Kress and the police. If the existence of a conspiracy was "X," the
Adickes Court held that Kress was required to produce affirmative evidence
showing "not-X" (that is, that "X" is false).8' Only then would Adickes have
had to come forward with evidence of a genuine issue regarding the relevant
fact.
D. Celotex's Trilogy Companions: Matsushita and Anderson
Matsushita, decided in March of 1986, involved an antitrust claim against
Japanese television manufacturers. 82 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had conspired to sell televisions to the United States at artificially low prices in
order to force American manufacturers out of the market.83 In concluding that
the lower court should have granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, the Supreme Court stated: "When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." 84 Furthermore, "if
the factual context renders [plaintiffs'] claim implausible ... [plaintiffs] must
come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would
otherwise be necessary.
85
The Court decided Anderson on June 25, 1986, the same day as Celotex.86
The defendant in Anderson moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's
defamation claim, arguing that it had not acted with "actual malice" as required
for defamation claims by public figures. 87 Because a plaintiff must establish
actual malice by "clear and convincing" evidence, Anderson raised the narrow
issue of the proper approach to summary judgment motions when the
dispositive issue is subject to a heightened standard of proof.88 Nonetheless,
81. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 17, at 367 (using "X" and "not-XC' terminology to illustrate
basic summary judgment mechanics).
82. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,577-78 (1986)
(describing the parties and the nature of the plaintiffs' claim).
83. Id. at 578.
84. Id. at 586 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 587.
86. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).
87. Id. at 245.
88. Id. at 247.
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the Court made several important statements about summary judgment
generally. In particular, Anderson stated that the summary judgment standard
"mirrors the standard for a directed verdict" 89 and thus depends on whether
"there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party." 90 Anderson also instructed that courts may grant
summary judgment when the evidence supporting the plaintiffs claim "is
merely colorable or is not significantly probative."
91
Matsushita and Anderson helped to illuminate the general concept of what
a "genuine issue" is for the purpose of Rule 56, with Anderson explicitly
linking the "genuine issue" standard to the standard for a directed verdict at
trial.92 However, Matsushita and Anderson provided little guidance on the
details of each party's summary judgment burden. 93 That guidance was left to
the Court's Celotex decision.
IV. Celotex and Summary Judgment Burdens
Myrtle Catrett sued Celotex Corporation and several other defendants in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for the wrongful death of
her husband, Louis Catrett.94 Catrett alleged that her husband had died due to
exposure to Celotex's asbestos products. During discovery, Celotex served
89. Id. at 250.
90. Id. at 249.
91. Id. at 249-50 (citation omitted).
92. As to these issues, the holdings of Matsushita and Anderson were arguably no
different than what the Supreme Court had said in prior cases. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at
456-57 & nn. 130-32 (stating that Matsushita's "articulation of summary judgment principles
largely coincided with existing precedent" and that Matsushita "rel[ied] heavily" on First
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968), and Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the
Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to
Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 35, 36 & n.9 (1988) ("The application of directed
verdict sufficiency standards to summary judgment in [Anderson v.] Liberty Lobby was hardly a
radical idea." (citing Sartor v. Ark. Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944))).
93. In both cases, the Court assumed without deciding that the moving defendants had
met their burdens under Rule 56. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.4
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.10 (1986). In
Anderson, the Court simply remanded so the lower court could apply the "correct standard."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. In Matsushita, the Court concluded that the materials on which the
plaintiffs relied in their argument to the Supreme Court would be insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact, but it allowed the lower courts to consider whether other evidence existed
that would be sufficient. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597-98.
94. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986) (describing the prior history of
the case).
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interrogatories on Catrett asking her, among other things, for an identification
of potential witnesses supporting her claim and for detailed information about
any work Mr. Catrett did with asbestos. 95  Catrett's answers to these
interrogatories failed to identify any such witnesses or information, stating that
she would respond later with supplemental answers.
96
In September 1981, Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment
contending that there was no evidence that Mr. Catrett had been exposed to any
Celotex asbestos product. 97 Celotex withdrew this motion six weeks later but
then filed a second summary judgment motion in December 1981.98 This
motion asserted that the court should grant summary judgment because Catrett
had "failed to produce evidence that any [Celotex] product ... was the
proximate cause of the injuries alleged within the jurisdictional limits of [the
District] Court."99  At the time of his alleged exposure, Mr. Catrett had
apparently worked not in the District of Columbia, but in Illinois, for a
company called Anning & Johnson.1°°
In opposing the summary judgment motion, Catrett relied on three
documents: (a) a letter from William O'Keefe of Aetna Casualty & Surety,
Anning & Johnson's insurer, stating that Anning & Johnson had acquired
asbestos from a company that Celotex later purchased; (b) a letter from T.R.
Hoff, Anning & Johnson's assistant secretary, describing Mr. Catrett's duties
there and stating that Anning & Johnson had purchased an asbestos product
from a company Celotex now owned; and (c) deposition testimony by Mr.
Catrett in an earlier workers' compensation proceeding stating that his duties
with Anning & Johnson involved direct contact with asbestos products. 10 1
95. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Catrett I1), 826 F.2d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (reviewing Celotex's interrogatories and Catrett's responses), on remand from Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). One interrogatory asked Mrs. Catrett to identify "persons
having knowledge of facts relevant to the subject matter in this lawsuit" and to indicate whom
she planned "to produce as witnesses in the trial in this action." Id. (quoting interrogatory
number 26). Other interrogatories asked for information concerning Mr. Catrett's work with
asbestos, including the "type and identity of each such asbestos material" with which he worked.
Id. (quoting interrogatories number 51 and 52).
96. Id.
97. Shapiro, supra note 17, at 348.
98. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Catrettl), 756 F.2d 181,183 & n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1985), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
99. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319-20 (alteration in original) (quoting Celotex's second motion
for summary judgment).
100. Catrett l 756 F.2d at 183.
101. Id.; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 348. One month after filing her opposition to summary
judgment but before the district court ruled, Catrett also filed supplemental interrogatory
answers that listed T. R. Hoff as a person with "knowledge of facts relevant to the subject matter
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDENS
The district court granted Celotex's summary judgment motion, stating
at the close of oral argument that there had been no showing of exposure to a
Celotex product "within the District of Columbia or elsewhere. "'02 A divided
panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed. 0 3 Judge Starr, joined by Judge Wald,
held that Celotex had not met its burden under Adickes because it had
"offered no affidavits, declarations or evidence of any sort whatever in
support of its summary judgment motion. To the contrary, Celotex's motion
was based solely on the plaintiff's purported failure to produce credible
evidence to support her claim."' 4  Relying on Adickes, the majority
explained:
In this case Celotex proffered nothing. It advanced only the naked
allegation that the plaintiff had not come forward in discovery with
evidence to support her allegations of the decedent's exposure to the
defendant's product. Under settled rules, that barebones approach will
not do. Mrs. Catrett was simply not required, given this state of the
record, to offer any evidence in response.'0
5
Judge Bork dissented, arguing that "[t]he majority errs in supposing that a
party seeking summary judgment must always make an affirmative
evidentiary showing, even in cases where there is not a triable, factual
dispute."106
The Supreme Court granted Celotex' s petition for a writ of certiorari. 0 7
On June 25, 1986, the Supreme Court issued its decision.1°' Celotex
generated four separate opinions: (1) a majority opinion by then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell, and
O'Connor; (2) a concurring opinion by Justice White; (3) a dissenting
opinion by Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun; and (4) a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. The net result, by
a 5-4 margin, was to reverse the D.C. Circuit's decision and to remand for
further proceedings.
in this lawsuit" who would be called as a witness at trial. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
(Catrett I1), 826 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1987), on remand from Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986).
102. Catrett 1, 756 F.2d at 183 n.3.
103. Catrett 11, 826 F.2d at 33.
104. Catrett 1, 756 F.2d at 184.
105. Id. at 185 (footnotes omitted).
106. Id. at 188 (Bork, J., dissenting).
107. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986).
108. Id. at 317.
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A. Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
At the outset, it is worth noting the majority's general comments on the
goals and virtues of summary judgment:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.... Rule 56 must be construed with due
regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that
are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a
jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to
demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the
claims and defenses have no factual basis.
1°9
As for the specific issues presented in Celotex, the majority rejected the D.C.
Circuit's premise that Celotex had to present affirmative evidence that Mr.
Catrett had not been exposed to its asbestos products. "[U]nlike the Court of
Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving
party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the
opponent's claim."' 10 Rather, a defendant moving for summary judgment may
discharge its burden by showing that there is "an absence of evidence" to
support an essential element of plaintiff s case when the plaintiff will bear the
burden of proof at trial (as is typical)." 1
The majority also rejected the notion that Adickes imposed a heavier
burden on a moving defendant. Although the majority agreed that the Court in
Adickes reached the correct result,' 12 it stressed that Adickes should not "be
construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary
judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears
the burden of proof."' 1 3 In other words, if "X" is a necessary element of the
plaintiff's claim, the defendant is not required to produce affirmative evidence
showing "not-X"; the defendant can also meet its burden by showing that the
plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove "X" at trial.
109. Id. at 327 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 323.
111. Id. at325.
112. See id. ("It also appears to us that, on the basis of the showing before the Court in
Adickes, the motion for summary judgment in that case should have been denied.").
113. Id.
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The majority explained that when the defendant meets its burden, that is,
when its motion is "made and supported as provided in this rule,"'1 4 Rule 56(e)
requires the plaintiff "to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or
by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'
designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.""1 5 A
plaintiff must "make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof."'1 16 This "showing, if
reduced to admissible evidence," must be "sufficient to carry [the plaintiffs]
burden of proof at trial." 1
7
As for the materials with which a plaintiff might make such a showing, the
majority wrote that a plaintiff is not required to use materials that are "in a form
that would be admissible at trial."'1 8 The majority noted that "Rule 56 does not
require the nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses." 119 Rather:
Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by
any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the
mere pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that one would normally
expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which we have
referred. 1
20
In articulating all of these principles, the majority did little to illustrate how
they applied to the record presented in Celotex. Interestingly, the majority
opinion never explicitly stated that Celotex met its burden. That finding is
implicit, however, because the Court remanded the case solely to determine
whether Catrett's showing in response to the summary judgment motion was
sufficient.12 Because the majority left that ultimate determination up to the
114. Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. Ciy. P. 56(e)).
115. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), (e)).
116. Id. at 323.
117. Id. at 327.
118. Id. at 324.
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 327. The Court stated:
[T]he Court of Appeals declined to address either the adequacy of the showing
made by respondent in opposition to petitioner's motion for summary judgment, or
the question whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be
sufficient to carry respondent's burden of proof at trial. We think the Court of
Appeals with its superior knowledge of local law is better suited than we are to
make these determinations in the first instance.
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lower courts, one cannot infer whether Catrett's showing was, in the Supreme
Court's view, sufficient to avoid summary judgment.1
22
To summarize, the majority set forth the following principles in
connection with the defendant's and plaintiff s summary judgment burdens:1
23
(1) The plaintiff is not obligated to make a responsive showing unless the
defendant's motion is "made and supported as provided in [Rule 56]." 124
(2) The defendant may discharge its burden by showing that there is "an
absence of evidence" to support an essential element of the ?laintiff's case
on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial.
(3) The defendant can make this showing using any of the documents
listed in Rule 56(c), that is, pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions, "with or without supporting affidavits." 
26
(4) If the defendant meets its burden of showing an absence of evidence
on an essential element of the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff must respond by
making "a sufficient showing" with respect to that element.
127
(5) The plaintiff s showing is sufficient when her supporting materials are
such that, "if reduced to admissible evidence," they would be "sufficient to
carry [her] burden of proof at trial.'
128
122. Dividing once again 2-1, the D.C. Circuit concluded on remand that Catrett had met
her burden. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Catrett If), 826 F.2d 33, 33 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Bork, J., dissenting) ("The majority finds that she has met her burden, and has made
enough of a showing to defeat the motion for summary judgment. I disagree."), on remand from
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). It thus reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment. Id. The case settled shortly thereafter. Shapiro, supra note 17, at 360.
123. As elsewhere in this Article, I assume that the defendant is the party moving for
summary judgment, which is the scenario addressed in CelotexandAdickes. Consistent with the
identity of the parties in both Celotex and Adickes, I use "it" as the pronoun for the defendant
and "she" or "her" for the plaintiff.
124. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
125. See id. at 325 (describing the moving party's burden on a motion for summary
judgment).
126. See id. at 323 (identifying the documents that a party seeking summary judgment may
rely on to meet its burden); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (listing the documents that may "show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact").
127. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (stating that "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case").
128. Id. at 327.
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(6) In making this showing, the plaintiff is not required to use materials
that are "in a form that would be admissible at trial."'
29
(7) One would "normally" expect the plaintiff to make this showing from
any of the documents listed in Rule 56(c) except for the pleadings, that is,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits.
30
B. Opinions by Other Justices
Justice Rehnquist's opinion was the opinion of the Court and had the
support of five justices.13' Therefore, it states the Celotex holding for purposes
of stare decisis and is binding on the lower federal courts. 132 Nonetheless, the
other opinions are significant, both for the sake of completeness and because
some have helped to shape the competing myths of Celotex.
1. Justice White's Concurrence
Although Justice White joined Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, he
also wrote a separate concurrence. White reaffirmed that a moving defendant
"may rely on depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the like, to
demonstrate that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case,"'' 33 but he
stressed that the defendant must still "discharge the burden the Rules place
upon him: It is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting
129. Id. at 324.
130. Id.
131. Some have called Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the court a "plurality" opinion
because of Justice White's separate concurrence. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 8, at 230
("Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Celotex raises a number of practical questions."); see
also Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 777 (stating that Celotex was decided "without a majority
opinion"). Such statements overlook the fact that Justice White also joined Justice Rehnquist's
opinion, which makes Rehnquist's opinion a majority opinion supported by five justices. For
further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 338-44 and accompanying text.
132. See Max Gibbons, Of Windfalls and Property Rights: Palazzolo and the Regulatory
Takings Notice Debate, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1259, 1289 n.187 (2003) (noting that the Court's
majority opinion is binding, not any separate concurrence supporting the result); Earl M. Maltz,
The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1395, 1409 (2000) ("Treating
majority opinions as binding upon other actors is an indispensable corollary to the view that the
Supreme Court sits not only to decide cases, but also to establish more generally applicable
rules of law.").
133. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
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the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no
evidence to prove his case."' 34 Justice White added:
A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery or reveal his witnesses or
evidence unless required to do so under the discovery Rules or by court
order. Of course, he must respond if required to do so; but he need not also
depose his witnesses or obtain their affidavits to defeat a summary
judgment motion asserting only that he has failed to produce any support
for his case.
135
2. Justice Brennan's Dissent
In dissent, Justice Brennan stated that he did "not disagree with the
Court's legal analysis."' 36 Justice Brennan wrote that "as the Court confirms, a
party who moves for summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving
party has no evidence must affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the
record.'137 Justice Brennan explained how a moving defendant could show
such an absence:
This may require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party's
witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documentary evidence. If there
is literally no evidence in the record, the moving party may demonstrate
this by reviewing for the court the admissions, interrogatories, and other
exchanges between the parties that are in the record.138
Thus, according to Justice Brennan, "the nonmoving party may defeat a motion
for summary judgment that asserts that the nonmoving party has no evidence by
calling the court's attention to supporting evidence already in the record that
was overlooked or ignored by the moving party."' 13 9 He explained: "[i]n that
event, the moving party must respond by making an attempt to demonstrate the
inadequacy of this evidence, for it is only by attacking all the record evidence
allegedly supporting the nonmoving party that a party seeking summary
judgment satisfies Rule 56's burden of production."'140 Applying this standard,
Justice Brennan concluded that Celotex failed to meet its burden because the
three documents on which Catrett relied were already "in the record" at the time
134. Id. (White, J., concurring).
135. Id. (White, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Celotex filed its second summary judgment motion.14 ' Because the record
revealed at least one potential witness (Mr. Hoff), "Celotex was required, as an
initial matter, to attack the adequacy of this evidence." 1
42
With respect to Adickes, Justice Brennan agreed that the D.C. Circuit was
wrong to read Adickes as requiring Celotex "to submit evidence establishing
that plaintiff's decedent had not been exposed to Celotex asbestos."',43 Justice
Brennan emphasized, however, that his approach to summary judgment was
"fully consistent" with Adickes. 144 He noted that Adickes's response to Kress' s
summary judgment motion had "pointed to a statement from her own
deposition and an unsworn statement by a Kress employee, both already in the
record and both ignored by respondent, that the policeman who arrested
petitioner was in the store at the time she was refused service.' 45 Because the
presence of a policeman would allow ajury to permissibly infer a conspiracy,146
Justice Brennan viewed Adickes as holding that these documents meant that
Kress "had 'failed to fulfill its initial burden' of demonstrating that there was
no evidence that there was a policeman in the store."
147
3. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens's dissent focused on the fact that Celotex's motion for
summary judgment rested exclusively on "the lack of exposure in the District of
Columbia." 148 Therefore, the district court's unexplained conclusion that there
had been "no showing that the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant Celotex's
product in the District of Columbia or elsewhere"149 was "palpably
erroneous."' 150 The best course, according to Justice Stevens, was to "affirm the
reversal of summary judgment on that narrow ground." 151 Thus, Justice
Stevens disapproved "this Court's abstract exercise in Rule construction."'
152
141. Id. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 158 (1970)).
147. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157-58).
148. Id. at 338 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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He noted, however, that Catrett had "made an adequate showing-albeit
possibly not in admissible form-that her husband had been exposed to
[Celotex's] product in Illinois."1
53
C. What Celotex Fails to Tell Us About Summary Judgment Burdens
The majority opinion in Celotex leaves significant ambiguities with
respect to both the moving defendant's burden and the nonmoving plaintiff s
burden. How may a defendant show an "absence of evidence" for purposes of
meeting its initial burden?154 And what materials must the court consider in
determining whether the defendant has met this burden? Assuming that the
defendant meets its burden, what constitutes a "sufficient showing" by the
plaintiff to avoid summary judgment, and on what materials may the plaintiff
rely in making that showing?
1 55
1. The Defendant's Burden
The majority opinion did not explicitly discuss what a defendant must do
to show an "absence of evidence," except to say that a defendant can use any of
the documents listed in Rule 56(c) to make this showing. 156 While the majority
seemed to conclude that Celotex met its burden of showing an absence of
evidence with respect to exposure, the opinion did not explain why or how.
The facts of the case suggest at least two possibilities. One is that Celotex met
its burden because the Rule 56(c) documents contained no evidence of
exposure to a Celotex product. Another is that Celotex met its burden because
it had served interrogatories on Catrett asking her to describe and identify
evidence of her husband's exposure to a Celotex asbestos product, and Catrett
failed to do so.'
57
These two possibilities suggest very different approaches to determining
whether a defendant has shown an "absence of evidence." Under the first, the
defendant will meet its burden as long as the Rule 56(c) documents contain no
evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiff's claim. Under the
153. Id. at 338 (footnotes omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 325.
155. Id. at 323.
156. Id. at 324.
157. See id. at 320 (noting that Catrett had failed to identify in interrogatories any evidence
of her husband's exposure to Celotex asbestos products).
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second, the Rule 56(c) documents must be ones that, like Catrett's interrogatory
answers, would be expected to indicate supporting evidence but fail to do so.
As if to compound the ambiguity, the Celotex majority cited two
influential scholarly articles that took opposite views on this subject. The
majority stated that "[olne of the principal purposes of the summary judgment
rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and
we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this
purpose." 158 For this proposition, the majority cited articles by Martin Louis
and David Currie.
159
David Currie's article endorsed the first approach. He argued that the
mere filing of a summary judgment motion should be sufficient to require a
plaintiff to "produc[e] evidence sufficient to sustain a favorable verdict."' 6
Currie would not require the defendant to conduct any discovery designed to
elicit evidence that the plaintiff intended to use at trial. 16 1 Martin Louis, on the
other hand, believed that a defendant must use discovery to "obtain a preview
of his opponent's evidence on an essential element and contend, in support of
his motion, that the evidence is insufficient to discharge the opponent's
production burden." 162 Louis recognized that, when the plaintiff identified
witnesses in response to such discovery, a defendant would be required to
depose those witnesses in order to establish that the evidence they could
provide at trial would be insufficient to carry plaintiff's burden.
163
A related issue that Celotex failed to resolve explicitly is which materials a
court should consider in determining whether a defendant has shown an
"absence of evidence." While the Celotex majority explained that the
defendant could meet its burden using any of the documents listed in Rule
158. Id. at 323-24.
159. Id. at 324 n.5 (citing Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A
Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 752 (1974); David P. Currie, Thoughts on Directed
Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CI. L. REv. 72, 79 (1977)).
160. Currie, supra note 159, at 79.
161. See id. at 77-78 (criticizing the Adickes Court for requiring the defendant to foreclose
the possibility that there was a policeman in the store when the plaintiff had presented no
evidence indicating otherwise).
162. Louis, supra note 159, at 750. Louis also recognized a second method by which a
party might obtain summary judgment. He stated that "[b]y previewing his own proof, [a
summary judgment movant] can attempt to show the nonexistence of an essential element
asserted by the opposing party." Id. (emphasis added). This method was not pursued in
Celotex, however. Celotex did not base its motion on evidence showing that Mr. Catrett had
not, in fact, been exposed to any Celotex product.
163. See id. at 751 (noting that seeking summary judgment based on an absence of
evidence "commends itself whenever the opposing party's witnesses are few and can be deposed
without undue effort or expense").
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56(c), 164 it did not discuss whether other materials might also be considered to
decide whether the defendant has met its burden. It is clear from the opinion that
the majority did not consider Catrett's materials when addressing Celotex's
burden. But the majority failed to explain why the Court should not have
considered these materials in connection with Celotex's burden.
One possible explanation is that the majority viewed Catrett's materials as
having been revealed after Celotex filed its motion. 165 Justice Brennan disagreed
with this characterization of the record, noting that Catrett had presented these
materials in response to Celotex's first motion, which was withdrawn. 166 Thus,
Brennan argued that Catrett's materials should be considered for purposes of
whether Celotex met its burden because they were already "in the record" at the
time Celotex filed its second motion, which was the one granted by the trial
court.
167 The majority, however, viewed these materials has having been filed "in
response" to Celotex's motion.'68 If this was the logic underlying the majority's
approach, then perhaps it would be appropriate-as Brennan argues--to consider
materials favorable to the plaintiff as long as those materials were indeed "in the
record" before the defendant sought summary judgment.
169
But this is not the only inference one might draw. One might also infer that
the majority did not consider Catrett's materials because the defendant's burden is
to be evaluated solely based on the documents on which the defendant relies. On
this reading, materials submitted by the plaintiff "in response"' 70 to a defendant's
motion should be considered only in connection with whether the plaintiff has
met its burden, regardless of whether they were "in the record"'17' before
defendant filed its motion.
2. The Plaintiff's Burden
As for the plaintiff s burden, the majority did not decide whether Catrett
had made a "sufficient showing" in response to Celotex's summary judgment
164. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
165. See id. at 320 ("In response to petitioner's summary judgment motion, respondent
then produced three documents.").
166. Id. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Nelken, supra note 8, at 66 (stating that
the majority "misread the record as to when Celotex became aware of the three documents relied
on by the plaintiff').
168. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320.
169. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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motion. 72 The D.C Circuit did not address that issue in its initial opinion
because it concluded that Celotex had not met its initial burden.1 73 Thus, the
Supreme Court remanded the case for the D.C. Circuit to determine whether
Catrett had made a sufficient showing of exposure to Celotex's products.1
74
While the Celotex majority gave some general guidance about how a
plaintiff may satisfy its burden,175 the opinion begged obvious questions.
Under what circumstances can materials that are not "in a form that would be
admissible at trial" constitute a sufficient showing by the plaintiff on an
essential element of her case? 76 And under what circumstances may a plaintiff
defy the "normal[] expect[ation]" and make this showing using materials other
than affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions? 177 The
majority's opinion does not illuminate any of these issues.
V. The Myths of Celotex
Celotex's unanswered questions have given rise to competing myths,
which are described below. While these myths are plausible interpretations of
Celotex (the majority opinion is ambiguous on many important issues), they are
based principally, if not exclusively, on policy preferences-the myth-
propounders' own views about how summary judgment procedure should
operate in the federal system. These policy perspectives are important, to be
sure, and can help to illuminate the trade-offs that are at stake. However, the
prevailing myths have put the policy cart before the interpretive horse.
Scholars have yet to take a more traditional approach to finding the best reading
of Celotex in terms of what we customarily value when interpreting a decision.
This Article considers three such values: (1) consistency with prior cases;
(2) consistency with the text that the decision purports to interpret; and
(3) internal coherence with other parts of the majority opinion and with the
case's factual and procedural posture.
These simple values are consistent with basic principles of interpretation
and should not be controversial.17 8 As to the first, Celotex should be read to be
172. See id. at 326-27 (deferring to the Court of Appeals decision not to address the
adequacy of Catrett's showing).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 326-28.
175. See supra notes 114-20, 128-30 and accompanying text (outlining what a plaintiff
must do to satisfy her burden).
176. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
177. Id.
178. There is, to be sure, robust academic debate about interpretation and how best to
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consistent with prior Supreme Court cases, at least absent any indication of an
intent to overrule those cases. 179 Second, Celotex should be read in a way that
perform that task. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (exploring the
complexities of interpreting law); STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNrIIES (1980) (arguing that interpretive communities create
meaning); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277
(1985) (espousing "a theory of interpretation within a larger theory of legal reasoning"); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003)
(questioning the traditional methods of interpretation and suggesting new criteria); W. Bradley
Wendel, Professionalism As Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2005) (discussing
"the lawyer's responsibility as a law-interpreter and private law-giver"). Although some might
argue that the principal goal of interpretation is to achieve the best policy result, e.g., Richard A.
Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDozO L. REv. 1, 5 (1996) (stating that "[t]he pragmatist
judge" is one who "wants to come up with the best decision having in mind present and future
needs, and so does not regard the maintenance of consistency with past decisions as an end in
itself but only as a means for bringing about the best results in the present case"), many do not.
Ronald Dworkin, for example, has written:
If [a judge's] threshold of fit is wholly derivative from and adjustable to his
convictions of justice, so that the latter automatically provide an eligible
interpretation-then he cannot claim in good faith to be interpreting his legal
practice at all.
DWORKIN, supra, at 255.
In any event, it remains important for a practitioner or judge to justify her interpretation in
terms of "standard legal references." Michael E. Solimine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming
Federal Appellate Review, 58 Mo. L. REv. 287, 332 (1993) ("[M]ost judges strive in drafting
opinions to reconcile their preferences with standard legal references, such as statutory text and
judicial precedent."). Judge Posner might call this a positivist approach:
The judicial positivist would begin and usually end with a consideration of cases,
statutes, administrative regulations, and constitutional provisions-all these and
only these being 'authorities' to which the judge must defer in accordance with
Dworkin's suggestion that a judge who is not a pragmatist has a duty to secure
consistency in principle with what other officials have done in the past. [It is] the
judge's duty to find the result in the present case that would promote or cohere with
the best interpretation of the legal background as a whole.
Posner, supra, at 4-5; see also DWORKIN, supra, at 262 ("[Tlhe grounds of law lie in integrity,
in the best constructive interpretation of past legal decisions."). Whatever divergent views
scholars hold on interpretive theory, there should at least be consensus that, all other things
equal, an interpretation that achieves the values of consistency and coherency I articulate is
superior to an interpretation that does not.
179. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1990) (White, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe doctrine of stare decisis demands that we attempt to reconcile our prior
decisions rather than hastily overrule some of them."); Ex Parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363, 378
(1911) ("We must then either reconcile the cases or if this cannot be done determine which line
rests upon the right principle and having so determined overrule or qualify the others and apply
and enforce the correct doctrine."); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir.
2002) (Posner, J.) ("[W]e have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter
how out of touch with the Supreme Court's current thinking the decision seems."); Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Scholarly debate about the
continuing viability of a Supreme Court opinion does not, of course, excuse the lower federal
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is consistent with the text of the governing sources, absent any indication that a
superior legal source supersedes the governing text, such as when a statute or
rule of procedure is unconstitutional.180 Third, Celotex should be read so that
different parts of the majority opinion are consistent with other parts of that
opinion, and so that the majority's statements are relevant in light of the factual
and procedural issues presented by the case.1
8'
The myths of Celotex described below are not true to these values. On
some issues, they cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's holding
sixteen years earlier in Adickes. On others, they conflict with the actual text of
Rule 56. On others, they offer readings of Celotex that make little sense given
the factual and procedural posture of the case.
A. The Paper Trial Myth
Many cases and commentators read Celotex as placing essentially no
burden at all on a defendant seeking summary judgment. 18 2 Because the
plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment should be
granted unless the plaintiff can provide evidence to the court that would be
sufficient to avoid a directed verdict if that were the evidence presented at
courts from applying that opinion."), affd sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
180. E.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that the Court's opinion, which he joined, "convincingly explains why its construction
of 18 U.S.C § 844(i) better fits the text and context of the provision than the Government's
expansive reading"); United States v. Lasaga, 328 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) (following an
interpretation of a federal sentencing guideline that is "more consistent with the text"); United
States v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1278, 1288 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters,
Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting a construction of the Americans with
Disabilities Act that is "more consistent with the text and structure of the statute," even though
"the evidence does not perfectly align in its favor"); see also DWORKIN, supra note 178, at 338-
40 (noting that a prudent justice must consider what the text of the statute requires).
181. See Carmick v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 126, 139 (1866) (stating that prior case law
should be "read in the light of its own facts and history, and with reference to them, and not as
an abstract homily on law in general"); see also Prymer v. Ogden, 29 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1994) (rejecting proposed interpretation of Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1989),
because Gray "must be read in the context of the procedural posture presented to the court in
that case").
182. See Redish, supra note 8, at 1345 ("Since Celotex, the majority of lower federal courts
have wisely read that decision to impose virtually no burden at all on the movant where she
would have no burden of proof at trial."); see also EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY
JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 79 (2d ed. 2000) (arguing that there is "no reason to
impose any triggering burden on a movant for summary judgment who would not bear the
burden of production at trial").
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trial. 183 On this view, a defendant can "show" an "absence of evidence" merely
by stating that plaintiff has yet to provide any evidence to support one or more
essential elements of its claim.' 84 At that point, the plaintiff must come forward
with evidence that would be sufficient to sustain its burden of production at
trial.185
Moreover, the plaintiff s evidence must meet a strict standard with respect
to admissibility--one that mirrors the rules for admissibility at trial. 186 It is not
enough for the plaintiff to identify witnesses she plans to call at trial, even if the
plaintiff indicates how she expects those witnesses to testify. Likewise, it is not
enough to present information via deposition transcripts, interrogatory
responses, or affidavits when the witness, signatory, or affiant would not be
competent to testify to such information at trial. 187 The plaintiff must provide
what this Article calls "trial-quality" evidence-sworn statements, via
183. See Redish, supra note 8, at 1344 (noting that the "standards for summary judgment
and directed verdict are fungible"); see also BRUNEF ET AL., supra note 182, at 85 ("There is no
reason to impose a burden on the movant at summary judgment that he would not bear in
moving for directed verdict at trial.").
184. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 239 (reading Justice Rehnquist's opinion as holding
that "the burden on the moving party can be met by pointing out that the discovery record fails
to contain admissible evidence to support the nonmoving party's case").
185. See Street v. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
[defendant] could challenge the opposing party to 'put up or shut up' on a critical issue.... [I]f
the respondent did not 'put up,' summary judgment was proper.").
186. E.g., Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Celotex
did not alter the settled law that 'Rule 56(e) requires the adversary to set forth facts that would
be admissible in evidence at trial.' (quoting 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2727 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d
787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that because plaintiff could not use proffered expert testimony
at trial, he could not rely on it for summary judgment purposes); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,
895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Hearsay evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered
on a motion for summary judgment."); Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925
(9th Cir. 1987) (ruling that unauthenticated documents are not admissible because they cannot
be admitted into evidence at trial); Redish, supra note 8, at 1344 n.53 (questioning the
reasoning by which the Celotex Court approached the standard of admissibility at trial versus
the standard for summary judgment); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 233 (noting "the commonly
understood implication that the content of the discovery record also must meet the same
substantive trial test of admissibility in order to create an issue of fact").
187. See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, 895 F.2d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that a
court may consider interrogatory answers only if they "show affirmatively that the signing party
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein" (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e))); WILLIAM
W. SCHWARZER Er AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONS 47-52 (1991) (discussing the evidence on which the nonmoving party may
rely and, in particular, restrictions on the use of inadmissible evidence).
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affidavits, depositions, or interrogatory answers, by a swearer with personal
knowledge of the facts stated.'88
This approach to summary judgment essentially treats the summary
judgment record as a paper trial. When that record contains no trial-quality
evidence, or when such evidence would be insufficient to carry the plaintiff's
burden at trial, summary judgment would be granted for the defendant. The
plaintiff bears the burden of putting trial-quality evidence into the record just
as she would at trial.
The policy rationale for treating summary judgment as a pretrial paper
trial is straight-forward. The purpose of summary judgment is to prevent trial
when there will be no genuine dispute to be resolved by live testimony before
the jury. If the plaintiff does not provide sufficient trial-quality evidence at
the summary judgment stage, there is no reason to think she will be able to
provide that evidence at trial. Since the defendant will have no burden of
production at trial, there is no reason to impose a burden on the defendant for
purposes of summary judgment. 189
This approach may be defensible as a matter of policy. However, it fails
in terms of the interpretive values I have described above. First, this
approach places Celotex in fundamental conflict with the Adickes decision
sixteen years earlier. The Court's rationale in Adickes-that summary
judgment was improper because of Kress's "failure to foreclose the
possibility" that a police officer was in the store -is flatly inconsistent with
the view that a defendant should face no burden when moving for summary
judgment. Under the paper trial myth, the court should have granted
summary judgment in Adickes because none of Adickes' s summary judgment
materials were trial-quality. Adickes submitted (a) her own deposition
testimony that her student had seen a police officer in the store and (b) an
unsworn statement by a Kress employee that there was a police officer in the
store.191 Thus, this approach cannot be reconciled either with Adickes or with
the Celotex majority's statement that Adickes reached the correct result.192 If
188. See, e.g., Garside, 895 F.2d at 49 (stating that interrogatory answers "should be
accorded no probative force where they are not based upon personal knowledge").
189. See Redish, supra note 8, at 1343 ("[T]here exists no justification for imposing any
burden on a movant for summary judgment that would not parallel the burden that party would
have at trial prior to moving for judgment as a matter of law."); see also BRUNET ET AL., supra
note 182, at 85 ("There is no reason in logic or practicality, then, to impose a burden on the
movant at summary judgment that he would not bear in moving for directed verdict at trial.").
190. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
191. Id. at 156-57 nn.13-14.
192. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (stating that the Court was
correct in denying summary judgment in Adickes).
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we accept the paper trial myth, we must also accept that Adickes was wrongly
decided.' 93
Second, this myth fails to provide a sensible account of what the Celotex
majority meant when it said that a plaintiff does not have to use materials that
are "in a form that would be admissible at trial."'9 4 The standard account that
proponents of this view give is that the majority was simply recognizing that
affidavits may be considered for purposes of summary judgment, even though
affidavits (which by definition have not been cross-examined) are not
admissible at trial' 95 They note that the very next sentence in the opinion states
that "Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose her own
witnesses," 196 and they infer that Rule 56 does require the nonmoving party to
obtain affidavits of her witnesses. 197
The term "depose," however, frequently refers not only to the taking of a
deposition as provided for in the federal rules, but also to the swearing of an
affidavit. 98 Thus, the majority's statement that "Rule 56 does not require the
nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses" 199 may plausibly be read as
193. Indeed, many propounders of this myth freely admit that it does not reconcile Celotex
and Adickes. See BRUNEr ET AL., supra note 182, at 81 (noting that Celotex's handling of
Adickes was disingenuous insofar as it "suggest[ed] that no change was being made in the
standard"); Redish, supra note 8, at 1342 ("[T]he Court's rejection of the prior standard for
determining whether the court reaches the merits of the summary judgment action, associated
primarily with its earlier decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., makes perfect sense.")
(emphasis added); id. at 1344 & n.53 (describing the Celotex majority's refusal to repudiate
Adickes as "stubborn" and "mystifying" and stating that the majority's description of Adickes
"brings to mind Groucho Marx's famous line when his wife surprised him in the company of his
lover: 'Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?"').
194. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
195. See Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187,192(5th Cir. 1991) ("[It is clear
that the Supreme Court meant merely that full depositions were not required, and that other
documents listed in Rule 56(c), such as 'answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits,' could suffice."); Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920,
925 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that affidavits could be considered for summary judgment
purposes); SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 187, at 50 (concluding that "[t]he facts on which the
nonmovant may rely must be admissible at trial, but need not be in admissible form as
presented" in opposition to summary judgment).
196. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
197. See, e.g., SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 187, at 50 (finding "that Celotex merely
clarifies the nonmovant's right to oppose a summary judgment motion with any of the materials
listed in Rule 56(c), including affidavits of its own witnesses that may contain testimony in a
form not admissible at trial").
198. See James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1551 n.93 (1995) (explaining that the term depose typically
includes taking an affidavit).
199. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
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rejecting the notion that a plaintiff must obtain affidavits of her witnesses in
order to avoid summary judgment. Moreover, the view that the majority
intended only to carve out an exception for affidavits cannot be reconciled with
the factual posture of Celotex itself. Catrett had not relied on affidavits in
opposing Celotex's motion.200 Rather, she presented copies of two letters (from
the insurer and the assistant secretary of Mr. Catrett's employer) and the
decedent's own deposition testimony from an earlier proceeding to which
Celotex was not a party.201 If affidavits are the only materials that courts may
consider on summary judgment despite being inadmissible at trial, the majority
would have had no need to remand the case. There certainly would have been
no need to remand the case out of deference to the D.C. Circuit's "superior
knowledge of local law. ,,202
B. The Dissenters' Myth
Other courts and commentators have endorsed the approach followed by
Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion. 203  According to this myth, a
defendant who seeks to meet its burden by showing that there is an "absence of
evidence" must establish the inadequacy of any documents or potential
witnesses reflected "in the record. ''204  There appears to be little or no
admissibility requirement under this approach. The defendant would have to
refute materials in the record even if those materials are (a) hearsay, such as
Adickes's deposition testimony that her student had seen a police officer in the
store;20 5 (b) unswom statements, such as Irene Sullivan's unswom statement on
which Adickes relied; 20 or (c) unauthenticated documents, such as the letters
200. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Catrett ), 756 F.2d 181, 183 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (listing the evidence that Catrett relied on in opposition to summary judgment), rev'd sub
nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
201. Id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 17, at 348 (describing the materials that Catrett
submitted in opposing the motion).
202. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
203. See, e.g., Nelken, supra note 8, at 68 (endorsing Justice Brennan's approach).
204. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Nelken, supra note 8, at
68 ("[Ihe party seeking to rely on the absence of record evidence as a basis for summary
judgment has an obligation to pursue leads obtained in discovery.").
205. Adickes v. S. H. Kress& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 156-57 & n.13 (1970); see also Celotex,
477 U.S. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicating that Adickes's deposition testimony
prevented Kress from meeting its burden).
206. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 156-57 & n.14; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 333-34 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicating that the unsworn statement from Irene
Sullivan prevented Kress from meeting its burden).
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by O' Keefe and Hoff on which Catrett relied. 20 7 Even if the record lacks such
supportive materials, the defendant must also "show that reasonable efforts
have been made to uncover the relevant evidence, through use of
interrogatories, document requests, depositions, and requests for admission."
20 8
There are also valid policy rationales for this approach. One is to maintain
the integrity of the discovery process set forth elsewhere in the Federal Rules. 2°
The discovery devices themselves authorize a defendant to obtain information
about the plaintiff's claims and evidence. If a defendant wishes, for example,
to test the credence or knowledge of a plaintiffs witness, it may notice a
deposition of that witness.2 10 But a defendant who has not made use of such
discovery procedures should not be able to use a summary judgment motion to
force a plaintiff not only to disclose what her evidence will be but also to create
trial-quality evidence that would support an essential element of her claim.
Melissa Nelken explained that "[d]iscovery is as integral a part of the Federal
Rules as summary judgment. There is little merit in an interpretation of
summary judgment procedure that would encourage parties not to use the
discovery rules, in hopes of then invoking summary judgment to force an
opponent to reveal his case.' ' 2 11 Another policy justification for the dissenters'
212myth is the danger of harassment. 2 If the rules impose little or no burden on a
defendant who seeks summary judgment on an "absence of evidence" theory,
defendants could file summary judgment motions simply to harass plaintiffs by
forcing them to create affidavits from their own witnesses in order to avoid a
summary dismissal.
While the dissenters' myth may enjoy the support of worthy policy
arguments, it has serious problems as a coherent reading of Celotex in terms of
traditional interpretive values. At the outset, of course, arguing that a case's
holding is actually the one stated by the dissenters raises an interpretive red
207. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Nelken, supra note 8, at 68-69; see also Nissan Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc.,
210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[i]n a typical case the moving party will have
made reasonable efforts, using the normal tools of discovery, to discover whether the
nonmoving party has enough evidence to carry its burden of persuasion at trial").
209. See Nelken, supra note 8, at 68 ("Any other rule would vitiate the incentive to do
thorough discovery before moving for summary judgment.").
210. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (providing the procedures for taking oral depositions).
211. Nelken, supra note 8, at 66.
212. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Such a burden of production is no burden at all and would simply permit summary judgment
procedure to be converted into a tool for harassment."); Nelken, supra note 8, at 68 ("Any other
rule would encourage the use of summary judgment to harass the nonmoving party or to force
him to disclose his case prematurely.").
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flag.21 3 Even so, the dissenters' myth of Celotex cannot be reconciled with the
Court's reasoning in Adickes. Perhaps this myth can explain the result reached
in Adickes. As Justice Brennan states, "the record" in Adickes indicated
potential witnesses-Adickes's student Carolyn Moncure and the Kress
employee Irene Sullivan-who might be able to testify that a police officer was
214in the store. Because Kress had not "demonstrate[d] the inadequacy" of these
potential witnesses, such as by deposing them, adherents to the dissenters' myth
would argue that Kress had failed to meet its burden and summary judgment
should therefore have been denied.215
But this attempt to reconcile the two cases ignores the Adickes Court's
actual reasoning. Adickes concluded that Kress failed to meet its burden
because Kress' s own materials-the affidavits of the police officers and store
manager-had "fail[ed] to foreclose" the possibility that a police officer was in
the store.21 6 The Court did not base its finding on Adickes's hearsay testimony
or Irene Sullivan's unsworn statement.217 To the contrary, it indicated that
there were problems with these materials and that they would not have been
sufficient to avoid summary judgment if Kress's affidavits had denied the
officers' presence in the store.218
In addition, the dissenters' approach is inconsistent with the text of Rule
56(c), which mandates summary judgment when the "pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories. ... admissions... [and] affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact., 2 19  According to the
dissenters' myth, the presence of materials suggesting potential witnesses or
evidence can thwart a summary judgment motion even if such materials are not
listed in Rule 56(c). 220 But Irene Sullivan's unsworn statement in Adickes, for
213. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council and its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1, 20 n. 127 (2002) ("[Clourts should resist relying too much on dissenting opinions when
trying to interpret unclear sections of a majority decision.").
214. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 156-57 & nn.13-14 (1970) (discussing the statements of the witnesses).
215. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding that Kress "had
'failed to fulfill its initial burden' of demonstrating that there was no evidence that there was a
policeman in the store" (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157-58)).
216. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157.
217. See id. at 160 (finding that the petitioner did not have to provide any opposing
evidence because respondent had failed to meet its burden).
218. See id. (noting that if respondent had met its initial burden, petitioner would have
been required to respond with appropriate affidavits).
219. FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(c).
220. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (explaining the dissenters' myth).
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example, was not a pleading, a deposition, an answer to an interrogatory, an
admission, or an affidavit. Why should it be considered to determine whether
Rule 56(c)'s threshold for summary judgment is satisfied?
Finally, it is unclear how the text of Rule 56 supports the requirement-
however laudable as a policy matter-that the defendant make "reasonable
efforts" to uncover plaintiff's relevant evidence. If Rule 56(c) required an
examination of the defendant's discovery efforts, we would surely want to
examine whether the defendant made requests for production of documents to
uncover plaintiff's evidence,221 but Rule 56(c) does not list either requests for
production or their fruits among the items that a court should consider in
222deciding a summary judgment motion. Likewise, we might expect
Rule 56(c) to include not only "answers to interrogatories, 223 but also the
interrogatories themselves.
C. Other Myths
Shortly after Celotex was decided, John E. Kennedy offered an alternative
understanding of Celotex that attempted to reconcile it with Adickes.224 He
suggests that in both cases, the plaintiff had "made enough of an imperfect
showing" to avoid summary judgment under Rule 56(0.225 Rule 56(f) allows
the court to "order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had. ,226 On this view, both plaintiffs
had "made showings of sufficient strength and quality" such that "[t]he trial
court would have abused its discretion not to allow both Adickes and Catrett
continuances to perfect their summary judgment evidence. 227 While neither
plaintiff had provided supportive materials in "an evidentiary form acceptable
to defeat summary judgment,, 228 their showings were such that they deserved
an opportunity to convert their inadequate materials into an admissible form.229
221. See FED. R. CIv. P. 34 (authorizing requests for production of documents and things).
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
223. Id.
224. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 247-48 (trying to reconcile the two cases based on Rule
56(f)).
225. Id. at 248.
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(0.
227. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 247.
228. Id. at 248.
229. See id. at 247 ("The trial court would have abused its discretion not to allow both
Adickes and Catrett continuances to perfect their summary judgment evidence."). This
approach might be viewed as a milder version of the dissenters' myth. Justice Brennan took
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Kennedy readily admitted that "[t]he problem with this reconciliation of
the two cases... is that neither Adickes nor Catrett made requests for
continuance under Rule 56(f). 230 In addition, the Supreme Court did not base
its Adickes and Celotex decisions on Rule 56(f). The Court did not indicate, for
example, that Adickes would still have to get an affidavit from either her
student Carolyn Moncure or the Kress employee Irene Sullivan. To the
contrary, the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because
Kress had failed to meet its burden.231 Thus, like the dissenters' myth, it
ignores the actual reasoning of Adickes, which based its reversal on Kress's
failure to meet its burden due to problems with the affidavits that Kress
provided in support of its motion.232 The Court did not find that Adickes's
materials, which admittedly were not trial-quality,233 were sufficient to avoid
summary judgment.
Kennedy also suggested, but did not endorse, another reading of Celotex
that might reconcile it with Adickes: one might call it the right-to-remain-silent
myth. On this view, "Kress waived its summaryjudgment right to remain silent
by attempting to testify with affidavits on its own behalf.''234 In Adickes,
"Kress's own affidavits supplied and raised the issue of fact which negated
Kress's satisfaction of its initial burden to show no issue of fact. '" 235 In Celotex,
on the other hand, "Celotex' [s] silence in its motion supplied and raised no
factual issue."236 Had Kress, like Celotex, provided no affidavits, then it would
have met its burden.237
Kennedy himself recognized that "[t]his reconciliation is somewhat
perverse."238 In terms of this Article's methodology, it strains against both the
arguably the most plaintiff-friendly view of Adickes and Celotex--the presence of evidence that
was not trial-quality was still enough to defeat a summary judgment motion because such
evidence would preclude the defendant from meeting its burden. See supra Part IV.B, notes
205-09, and accompanying text (describing the dissenters' myth). In Kennedy's approach, the
presence of such evidence is not enough to keep the defendant from meeting its burden but
would warrant giving the plaintiff enough time to "perfect" it by converting it to trial-quality
evidence. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 247-48.
230. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 248.
231. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
232. See id. (reversing summary judgment because Kress's materials did not "foreclose the
possibility that there was a policeman in the store").
233. See id. at 159 n. 19 (pointing out the flaws in Adickes's summary judgment evidence).
234. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 247.
235. Id. at 246.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 247.
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text of Rule 56 and the actual language of the Celotex majority. The basic
standard for granting summary judgment is whether the materials listed in Rule
56(c) "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."23 9 While this
language is admittedly vague and subject to interpretation, it is hard to see why
a defendant should hurt its cause by introducing materials that would tend to
support the defendant's view of the facts.
The right-to-remain-silent approach also conflicts with the Celotex
majority's statement that a "principal purpose[] of the summary judgment rule
is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we
think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this
purpose. ''240 If the defendant is truly able to show that the plaintiff will lack
evidence to support her claim at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate
even if the defendant also produced affirmative evidence that, standing alone,
would not fully "foreclose" the plaintiff's claim. This leaves open the key
question of what a defendant must do to demonstrate that plaintiffs claims are
unsupported, but it illustrates that the presence of additional evidence
supporting the defendant should not contaminate a showing that is otherwise
sufficient to show an absence of evidence.
Finally, it is worth noting that a panel of the Eleventh Circuit endorsed a
unique reading of Celotex. In Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. ,241 the court
concluded that Celotex created only a narrow exception to Adickes's "general
rule" that a defendant must submit evidence that would "foreclose the
possibility '242 of plaintiff being able to establish a necessary element of her
claim.243 According to Clark, Celotex allows a moving defendant to prevail
without negating an element of the plaintiff's claim only in "the unusual
situation.., where neither party could prove either the affirmative or the
negative of an essential element of the claim. "244 The Clark court presumably
did not view Adickes as this kind of situation, perhaps because Kress was in a
position to prove-with affidavits of the police officers and/or Kress
employees-that there had been no conspiracy (although it failed to do so).
This interpretation is also unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the Celotex
majority hardly viewed it as a "general rule" that a defendant must submit
evidence that would foreclose the possibility of a necessary element of
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
240. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
241. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11 th Cir. 1991).
242. Id. at 606.
243. See id. at 608 (stating Adickes's rule on the moving party's burden and finding that
"Celotex did not change the general rule").
244. Id. at 607.
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plaintiff's claim. 245 To the contrary, it stated that Adickes should not "be
construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary
judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears
the burden of proof."246 Even if Celotex intended to create only a "narrow
exception" to the Adickes rule,247 it is a stretch to infer that this exception
applied only when the defendant could not "prove [a] negative 248 because the
Celotex majority never made any reference to whether Celotex would have
been able to prove a lack of exposure with affirmative evidence. And if
summary judgment is designed "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses, ,249 a convincing showing of an absence of evidence should
warrant summary judgment even if the defendant might also have provided
affirmative evidence that a factual predicate to the plaintiffs claim is false.
Whether a defendant is able to show such an absence of evidence bears no
relation to whether the defendant could also have proved the negative of that
element, were it so inclined. Finally, it is unclear how the Clark court's
approach fits with the text of Rule 56.
D. Myth-ing in Action: The Lower Courts Interpret Celotex
1. Defendant's Burden
Lower courts have conflicting views with respect to the scope of the
defendant's burden under Celotex.250 Most courts seem to follow the paper trial
myth, imposing virtually no burden on defendants moving for summary
judgment. 251 While courts often give lip service to the proposition that "the
245. Id. at 608.
246. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
247. Supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
248. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 607 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
249. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
250. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 n.2 (11th Cir. 1993)
("[Tlhere has been some confusion among courts as to the nature of the showing required when
the movant seeks to discharge the initial responsibility by demonstrating that there is an absence
of evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case.").
251. E.g., Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664,671 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[A] movant
that will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant's claim."); Street
v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he movant could challenge the
opposing party to 'put up or shut up' on a critical issue... [If the respondent did not 'put up'
summary judgment was proper."); see also Redish, supra note 8, at 1345 ("Since Celotex, the
majority of lower federal courts have wisely read that decision to impose virtually no burden
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initial burden is on the moving party to show the court 'that there is an absence
of evidence to support the non-moving party's case,' ,252 they nearly as often
either ignore that burden entirely or presume that the burden is necessarily met
as long as there is insufficient trial-quality evidence in the summary judgment
record to support plaintiff's claim.
253
Some notable lower court decisions, however, either follow the dissenters'
myth or impose a more substantial burden on a moving defendant.254 One
Sixth Circuit panel, for example, found it improper for the district court to grant
summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to produce evidence to rebut
the defendant's assertion that a particular fact was undisputed. 255 The panel
reasoned that the defendant, "as the party moving for summary judgment, had
the initial burden of production and persuasion on the motion." 256 Judge
Fletcher (a former Civil Procedure professor257) authored a Ninth Circuit
decision that endorsed the dissenters' myth, concluding that a defendant
seeking summary judgment on an absence of evidence theory must "have made
reasonable efforts, using the normal tools of discovery, to discover whether the
nonmoving party has enough evidence to carry its burden of persuasion at
trial. ,258 Finally, as already mentioned, the Eleventh Circuit's Clark decision
held that a defendant must use affirmative evidence negating the existence of
at all on the movant where she would have no burden of proof at trial.").
252. Manders v. Okla. ex rel. Dep'tof Mental Health, 875 F.2d263,264(10th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
253. E.g., id. at 265 (granting summary judgment because "[a] review of the record reveals
that plaintiffs failed to offer evidence of any conduct by defendant which indicated a
continuation of his alleged sexual harassment"). One empirical study undertaken after Celotex
indicated that 60% of decisions granting summary judgment for a defendant contained no
"discussion of the sufficiency of the defendant's production in support of the summary judgment
motion." Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 92.
254. E.g., Russ v. Int'l Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[B]efore the non-
moving party is required to produce evidence in opposition to the motion, the moving party
must first satisfy its obligation of demonstrating that there are no factual issues warranting
trial."); United States v. Four Parcels, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 n.19 (1lth Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
moving party must point to specific portions of the record in order to demonstrate that the
nonmoving party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial." (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325
(Brennan, J., dissenting))).
255. See Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 725-26 (6th Cir. 2000) (disagreeing
with the lower court's reasoning).
256. Id. at 725-26 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331-32, but failing to note that it was citing
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion).
257. Judges of the United States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, 35 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. xiii, xix-xx (2005).
258. Nissan Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDENS
an essential element, except in the "unusual situation... where neither party
could prove either the affirmative or the negative of an essential element."
259
2. Plaintiffs Burden
Lower court opinions also conflict over the plaintiff's burden, particularly
with respect to the materials on which a plaintiff may rely. Most courts seem to
follow the paper trial myth on this issue as well, requiring that the plaintiff
satisfy its burden with trial-quality evidence.260 One court explained:
Celotex did not alter the settled law that Rule 56(e) requires the adversary
to set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence at trial. Material that
is inadmissible will not be considered on a motion for summary judgment
because it would not establish a genuine issue of material fact if offered at
trial and continuing the action would be useless.26'
Some courts, however, have read Celotex as allowing a plaintiff to demonstrate
a genuine issue of fact using materials that fall short of the admissibility
standards that would govern at trial. After the Court remanded Celotex, the
D.C. Circuit decided that "even if the Hoff letter itself would not be admissible
at trial, Mrs. Catrett has gone on to indicate that the substance of the letter is
reducible to admissible evidence in the form of trial testimony. ,,262
259. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 607-08 (11th Cir. 1991).
260. See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[A]bsent a
showing of admissibility appellant may not rely on hearsay, whether or not embodied in an
interrogatory answer, to oppose proper motions for summary judgment."); Canada v. Blain's
Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is well settled that unauthenticated
documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment."); see also Sallis v. Univ.
of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The nonmoving party must show by admissible
evidence that specific facts remain which create a genuine issue for trial."). One court has
stated, apparently inadvertently, that a plaintiffs own affidavit is not sufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact, even if it was based on personal knowledge and set forth facts as would be
admissible at trial. See Ashbrook v. Block, 917 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
plaintiff "must employ proof other than his pleadings and own affidavits" to establish the
existence of specific triable facts).
261. Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990)).
262. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Catrett ), 826 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
on remand from Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); see also Offshore Aviation v.
Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1015 (1 1th Cir. 1987) ("The claim by [defendant] that the
letter is inadmissible hearsay does not undercut the existence of any material facts the letter may
put into question. Consideration of the letter does not turn on admissibility at trial but on
availability for review."). But see id. at 1016 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (debating whether
Celotex changed the law on admissibility standards for summary judgment purposes). The
concurrence argued that:
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VI. Dispelling the Myths: An Interpretive Approach to Celotex
In formulating an alternative approach to Celotex, this Article emphasizes
values that are traditionally employed when interpreting a case: (1) consistency
with prior Supreme Court cases; (2) consistency with the governing textual
sources; and (3) coherence with other parts of the opinion and relevancy given
the case's factual and procedural posture.263 This Part considers these values
with respect to both the defendant's burden and the plaintiffs burden and
proposes a new approach to summary judgment. This Part also explains how
this approach reconciles the Celotex majority opinion with Justice White's
concurring opinion. Finally, this Part responds to potential critiques of my
approach to summary judgment.
A. Reconsidering the Defendant's Burden
With respect to the defendant's summary judgment burden, a principal
problem with the prevailing myths is their inability to reconcile Celotex with
the result and reasoning of the Court's earlier decision in Adickes. The first
step toward a coherent reading of Celotex and Adickes is to heed Martin
Louis's pre-Celotex observation that there are two distinct ways for a defendant
to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact:
First, through discovery he can obtain a preview of his opponent's evidence
on an essential element and contend, in support of his motion, that the
evidence is insufficient to discharge the opponent's production burden....
Second, by previewing his own proof he can attempt to show the
nonexistence of an essential element asserted by the opposing party.264
If "X" is a necessary element of plaintiff's claim, a defendant seeking summary
judgment can either (1) show that plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove
"X" at trial, or (2) produce evidence showing "not-X" (that is, that "X" is false).
Celotex involved the first of these methods, and Adickes involved the
second.265 Celotex met its burden of showing that Catrett would lack evidence
The law in this circuit prior to Celotex clearly provided that evidence inadmissible
at trial could not be used to avoid summary judgment. Of course, the Supreme
Court could change the law. But, it is not plain to me that Celotex actually
endorses the use of hearsay in summary judgment proceedings (citations omitted).
Id.
263. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (setting forth the basic interpretive
principles that guide this Article's analysis).
264. Louis, supra note 159, at 750.
265. Judge Fletcher's decision in Nissan recognized this distinction as well. See Nissan
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to prove exposure because it served interrogatories that would be expected to
elicit a description or identification of any evidence Catrett might use at trial to
establish exposure.266 When Catrett identified no evidence or witnesses in her
answer to these interrogatories,267 Celotex could persuasively argue, in lockstep
with the text of Rule 56(c), that these "answers to interrogatories... show that
there is no genuine issue" as to whether Mr. Catrett had been exposed to
asbestos via a Celotex product.268
In Adickes, on the other hand, the defendant did not seek to show that the
plaintiff would lack evidence to support a necessary element of her claim.
269
Kress had not served interrogatories similar to the ones that Celotex did--or at
least did not rely on them in support of its summary judgment motion.27°
Unlike Celotex, Kress could not point to a Rule 56(c) document that would be
expected, but failed, to reveal any evidence that Adickes could use at trial to
establish a conspiracy. Instead, Kress relied on various affidavits in an attempt
to show "not-X," that is, that there in fact was no conspiracy between Kress and
any government official.271 Thus, Kress used what Martin Louis identified as
the second method of showing a lack of a genuine issue of material fact-
producing affirmative evidence that a condition necessary for plaintiff to
prevail is false.272 The Supreme Court held simply that Kress's evidence was
insufficient because it failed to foreclose the possibility that a police officer was
in the store and had reached an agreement with a Kress employee other than the
one who had provided a sworn affidavit.273 In other words, Kress's documents
failed to show "not-X."
Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
the "tension between Adickes and Celotex" stems from the fact that the cases "dealt with the two
different methods by which a moving party can carry its initial burden of production").
266. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 320 (1986) ("[Pletitioner noted that
respondent had failed to identify, in answering interrogatories specifically requesting such
information, any witnesses who could testify about the decedent's exposure to petitioner's
asbestos products.").
267. Id.
268. See id. at 322 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (discussing the Court's understanding of
Rule 56(c)).
269. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-58 (1970) (reviewing the
evidence that the defendant presented to show the absence of a necessary element of plaintiff's
claim).
270. See id. at 153-55 & nn.8-12 (describing the materials submitted by Kress in support
of its motion).
271. See id. at 153 (documenting Kress's attempt to show the absence of a conspiracy).
272. See Louis, supra note 159, at 750 ("[Bly previewing his own proof [the moving party]
can attempt to show the nonexistence of an essential element asserted by the opposing party.").
273. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157.
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81 (2006)
This conclusion is consistent with the majority's approach in Celotex.
One must simply recognize that the summary judgment record in Celotex
contained an important Rule 56(c) document that was missing in Adickes:
inadequate answers to interrogatories that would otherwise be expected to
identify or describe evidence plaintiff could use at trial. This material allowed
Celotex to meet its initial burden by showing an absence of evidence. Kress,
on the other hand, could not point to such a document and, therefore, lacked a
basis for showing an absence of evidence.
Thus, the best way to reconcile Adickes and Celotex is this: A defendant
seeking summary judgment on an absence of evidence theory must use Rule
56(c) documents that would be expected to reveal any evidence supporting the
plaintiff's claim, but that failed to do so. To illustrate, imagine what would
have happened in Adickes if Kress had conducted the kind of discovery that
Celotex did. Suppose that Kress had served interrogatories asking for evidence
and witnesses that would support Adickes's conspiracy claim. If Adickes failed
to identify any such evidence, Kress could have used that answer to show an
absence of evidence.
But suppose that Adickes's answer identified herself as a witness.
Because she revealed a witness, her answer to this hypothetical interrogatory
alone could not show that there would be an absence of evidence on this issue.
Kress would have to take additional steps, such as deposing Adickes, to show
an absence of evidence. Recall that Kress did depose Adickes, and her only
testimony supporting the existence of a conspiracy was that her student had told
her that there was a police officer in the store when they arrived.274 Because
this would be inadmissible hearsay on the issue of whether a police officer was
in fact in the store, Kress could rely on the interrogatory response, in
combination with the deposition testimony, to show that there would be an
absence of evidence.
Finally, suppose that Adickes had identified her student Carolyn Moncure
in her answer to the hypothetical interrogatory. Again, the identification of a
witness would preclude Kress from relying on the interrogatory answer alone to
show an absence of evidence. Kress could then depose the student. Although
no such deposition was taken, the student did testify at the trial on Adickes's
"custom of the community" claim, which had survived summary judgment.275
The student testified at trial just as the deposition of Adickes suggested she
would: there had been a police officer in the store that day.276 Assuming that
274. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 156 n. 13 (noting Adickes's deposition testimony that one of
her students had seen a police officer enter the store).
275. See id. (quoting the student's testimony).
276. See id. (recounting the student's testimony that "she saw a policeman come into the
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the student gave this same testimony in a deposition, Kress might still seek
summary judgment of the theory that this testimony is legally insufficient to
establish a conspiracy. While the Supreme Court suggested in Adickes that the
mere presence of a police officer in the store would suffice to support an
inference of a conspiracy between the officer and a Kress employee, 277 this is
an arguable proposition.278 If Kress had used the various discovery tools
described above, the interrogatory answers and depositions would have
revealed that the only evidence of a conspiracy would be testimony that a police
officer was present. At that point, Kress could have argued in its summary
judgment motion that such evidence is insufficient to support an inference of a
conspiracy and, thus, that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
This still leaves the question of what materials the court should consider in
determining whether a defendant has shown an "absence of evidence."
According to the dissenters' myth, assessing the defendant's showing requires
consideration of any materials that are "already in the record" at the time the
defendant filed its motion, including materials that were "overlooked or
ignored" by the defendant's motion.279 In Celotex, Justice Brennan believed
that Celotex had overlooked such materials-the two letters and Mr. Catrett' s
workers' compensation deposition.280 But the majority opinion indicated that
these materials should be examined in connection with the plaintiffs showing,
not the defendant' s.
281
Perhaps, as proponents of the dissenters' myth contend, the majority based
its approach on its misperception that these materials were not in the record at
282the time of the motion. Or perhaps the majority's approach could be limited
to the special situation in Celotex where a motion is filed, withdrawn, and then
renewed (albeit with important modifications).283 For a number of reasons,
store" while the group was awaiting service).
277. Id. at 158.
278. See Currie, supra note 159, at 77-78 (stating that any inference of a conspiracy based
on a policeman's presence in the store "appears strained").
279. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 204 and accompanying text (describing the dissenters' myth).
280. See id. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding that "Celotex was not free to
ignore supporting evidence that the record clearly contained").
281. See, e.g., id. at 326-27 (suggesting that petitioner's evidence of exposure should be
considered by the Court of Appeals in connection with the respondent's opposition to summary
judgment).
282. See id. at 320 ("In response to petitioner's summary judgment motion, respondent
then produced three documents.").
283. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (CatrettI), 756 F.2d 181,183 & n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (noting that Celotex first filed its motion for summary judgment in September 1981,
withdrew it in November, and re-filed it in December), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
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however, the best interpretation of Celotex is that the court should consider
only the Rule 56(c) materials that the defendant itself uses to support its
contention that there is an "absence of evidence."
First, the Celotex majority equates the defendant's burden with
Rule 56(e)'s requirement that the motion be "made and supported as provided
in this rule."284 As a textual matter, then, the most natural reading is to examine
whether defendant's motion is "supported" by Rule 56(c) documents showing
that there is an absence of evidence to support plaintiff' s claim. Second, this
approach is consistent with language used elsewhere in Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion. He defines the defendant's "initial responsibility" as
"identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. ,285 If the defendant were required to canvass the entire record, it would
never be sufficient merely to identify only "those portions" of Rule 56(c)
documents that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue.
B. Reconsidering the Plaintiffs Burden
With respect to the plaintiff's burden, the most puzzling aspect of Celotex
is what materials the court may consider. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
stated that the plaintiff does not have to use materials that are "in a form that
would be admissible at trial.,,286 He added, however, that "one would normally
expect" the plaintiff to make this showing from depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits.287 But when can materials that are not
"in a form that would be admissible at trial" constitute a sufficient showing by
the plaintiff on an essential element of her case? 288  And under what
circumstances may a plaintiff defy the "normal[] expect[ation]" that she make
her showing using affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
admissions?
289
477 U.S. 317 (1986); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 348-49 (summarizing Celotex's initial motion
for summary judgment, filed in September, and noting that Celotex refiled its motion in
December, "but this time the focus was quite different"); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319
(stating that Celotex's summary judgment motion "was first filed in September 1981").
284. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FEE. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
285. Id. at 323 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).





1. When Can a Court Consider Non-Rule 56(c) Documents?
Rule 56(c) sets forth the list of documents that determine whether "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact. ,290 If we aim to be faithful to the text
of Rule 56, the majority's suggestion that there could ever be an exception to
the "normal" expectation that a plaintiff use such documents is problematic.
The threshold interpretive question is this: when can something that is not a
Rule 56(c) document nonetheless merit consideration under Rule 56(c)?
One potential answer is that some materials are the substantial equivalent
of the documents enumerated in Rule 56(c). Answers to interrogatories, for
example, are properly considered under Rule 56(c). 291 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure relating to discovery create a duty to supplement answers to
interrogatories "seasonably," unless the "additional information" has been
"made known" to one's opponent either during discovery or in writing. 292 In
this way, the rules treat certain "information" as tantamount to supplemental
interrogatory answers when that information is disclosed to the opposing party.
The rules also state that when a party fails to provide such additional
information without substantial justification, that party may not use that
information.293 This bar applies not only to use at trial, but also to use in
connection with "any motion" before the court,294 including a summary
judgment motion.295
Thus, the federal rules deem information to be equivalent to a
supplemental answer to an interrogatory if it is provided in a seasonable manner
and with substantial justification for the party's failure to provide the
290. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
291. Id.
292. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). This Rule states:
A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response
is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing.
Id.
293. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(c)(1). This Rule states:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required
by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by
Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at
a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed.
Id.
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 358 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that Rule
37(c)(1) "can also be applied to motions for summary judgment").
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information in its initial answer. When material containing such information
satisfies the federal rules in this way, it is reasonable to treat that information as
tantamount to "answers to interrogatories" for purposes of Rule 56(c) and,
therefore, to consider that information for purposes of a summary judgment
296motion.
This reading of Rule 56(c) makes sense in light of the facts facing the
Court in Celotex. Among the materials Catrett presented in opposition to
Celotex's summary judgment motion were letters from Mr. Catrett's
employer's insurer and assistant secretary.297 These documents contained
information relating to the asbestos products Catrett's husband might have
handled while on the job. Thus they contained information that could be
deemed supplemental answers to Celotex's interrogatories, which had asked
Catrett to describe and identify evidence and witnesses relating Mr. Catrett's
exposure to any Celotex product.
298
2. When Can "Inadmissible" Materials Be Considered?
The other issue Celotex left unaddressed is when the court may consider
materials even though they are not "in a form that would be admissible at
trial."299 Rule 56 imposes no general standard of admissibility. With respect to
affidavits, however, Rule 56(e) requires that they "shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein." 300 The text of Rule 56 does not impose this requirement on the
other categories of documents listed in Rule 56(c).3°1
Rule 56(e) also provides that when a summary judgment motion "is made
and supported as provided in this rule," the responding party may not rest on
296. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Catrett II), 826 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (stating that "[t]here can, of course, be no doubt" that a supplemental answer to an
interrogatory can be considered because Rule 56(c) "specifically list[s] 'answers to
interrogatories'" (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c))), on remandfrom Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986).
297. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320.
298. See id. at 320 (stating that Rule 56(c) allows a party to oppose a summary judgment
motion using any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c) except the pleadings
themselves).
299. Id.
300. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
301. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (failing to impose a requirement that the other documents be in
a form admissible at trial).
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"mere allegations" in its pleading, but rather "must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 30 2 Although courts and
commentators often cite this language when they discuss summary judgment
admissibility, this portion of Rule 56(e) actually has nothing to do with whether
a particular material may be considered in connection with the plaintiffs
burden. Rather, it goes to the merits of the summary judgment inquiry-
whether the record "show[s] that there is no genuine issue" of "material fact.
303
To illustrate, suppose a defendant meets its summary judgment burden, and the
plaintiff responds solely with allegations in her complaint about the existence
of a particular element. Summary judgment should be granted not because
Rule 56(e) makes it improper to consider an allegation in her pleading, but
because a mere allegation in the plaintiffs complaint is not sufficient to show
that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Moreover, this is consistent with
the Celotex majority's instruction that a sufficient showing by the plaintiff must
be able to be "reduced to admissible evidence. ' 3°4  A mere pleading
allegation-absent the identification of a witness to support it-is not reducible
to admissible evidence.
Thus, Rule 56 does not impose any admissibility requirement, except for
affidavits. Many courts and commentators have assumed, consistent with the
paper trial myth, that summary judgment materials are subject to the same
admissibility requirements that would apply at trial. 30 5 For example, they have
refused to consider testimony in a deposition that would be hearsay if that same
testimony were introduced at trial for the truth of the matter asserted. 306 Those
who support this approach read Justice Rehnquist's statement as recognizing
only that affidavits may be considered for purposes of summary judgment even
though affidavit testimony is not "in a form that would be admissible at trial."
307
Other summary judgment materials such as depositions and interrogatories,
however, would be subject to usual evidentiary standards that would govern at
trial.
308
302. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
303. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
304. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
305. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (explaining that, under the paper trial
myth, a plaintiff's summary judgment evidence must generally meet the standards for
admissibility at trial).
306. See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Hearsay
evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.").
307. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (stating that proponents of this view
believe that Justice Rehnquist was "simply recognizing that affidavits may be considered for
purpose of summary judgment" even if such testimony is not in admissible form).
308. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (describing the "trial-quality" evidence
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The precise basis for importing trial evidentiary standards at the summary
judgment phase is unclear. Take hearsay, for example. As one commentator
has recognized, testimony that would be hearsay at trial is not necessarily
testimony that would be hearsay for purposes of summary judgment.3°9
Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the
matter asserted.31 Materials offered in opposition to summary judgment,
however, are not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. They are
offered to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial.3 ' Suppose
plaintiffs interrogatory answer identifies a witness and states that she
anticipates the witness's testimony will establish "X." That is clearly
inadmissible hearsay if the plaintiff seeks to introduce that interrogatory answer
at trial to establish "X." But at the summary judgment phase, the plaintiff is not
required to prove "X." She is only required to establish that there is a genuine
issue for trial.
To conclude that a court may consider particular material in assessing the
plaintiff's showing is not to say that this material is sufficient to meet the
plaintiff's burden. What exactly constitutes a "sufficient showing" by a
plaintiff when the defendant meets its burden by showing an "absence of
evidence" on a necessary element of plaintiff's claim? 312  Recall that a
defendant seeking summary judgment on an absence-of-evidence theory must
be able to point to a Rule 56(c) material that it would expect to identify
evidence the plaintiff might use at trial, but either fails to do so or identifies
evidence that would be insufficient to carry plaintiff s burden.31 3 Assuming the
defendant can do so (as Celotex did), suppose that the plaintiff responded not
with trial-quality evidence, but rather with a supplemental answer to an
interrogatory identifying and describing witnesses and evidence that would
support her claim. Would it still be the case that the Rule 56(c) materials show
no genuine issue as to any material fact?
required by proponents of the paper trial myth).
309. See Duane, supra note 198, at 1532 (concluding that assertions made in affidavits
submitted on a summary judgment motion are not hearsay).
310. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211,219 & n.7 (1974); Duane, supra note 198,
at 1532.
311. Duane, supra note 198, at 1532; see id. at 1535 ("[A] judge ruling on such a motion is
neither permitted nor required to draw any conclusions about what happened in the past-that
is, the truth of the matter asserted in the parties' pleadings and affidavits-but what will happen
at a future trial if there is one.").
312. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 417 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986).
313. See supra notes 264-73 and accompanying text (explaining the absence-of-evidence
theory and classifying Celotex as a case in which the defendant met its burden by demonstrating
the plaintiff's lack of evidence).
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If the plaintiff had provided that information in her original answer to the
defendant's interrogatory, the defendant would not be able to establish an
"absence of evidence" sufficient to meet its burden under my reading of
Celotex; the Rule 56(c) documents before the court would not show that there
is no "genuine issue" of material fact. The question, then, is whether the result
should be different simply because the plaintiff identified the witness in a
supplemental interrogatory answer. In both situations, the information before
the court is exactly the same. To conclude that summary judgment should be
granted in the first instance but not in the second would create not only an
intuitive inconsistency but also a textual anomaly. We would be requiring
courts to conclude that the same materials are enough to create a "genuine
issue" in one situation but not in another. If Rule 56(c)'s standard is to have an
ascertainable meaning, it should at least yield consistent results when applied to
identical records.
Obviously, the plaintiff's response is sufficient only if her materials are
"reduc[ible] to admissible evidence. 3 14 So materials that do not indicate that
there will be evidentiary support usable at trial would not suffice since they
would not indicate a genuine issue for trial. Suppose, for example, that Catrett
had produced only Mr. Catrett's deposition from his workers' compensation
proceeding. The transcript would not be admissible at trial because Celotex
was not a party to the earlier proceeding, 315 and it could not be "reduced to
admissible evidence" because Mr. Catrett was deceased by that point in time.
This hypothetical showing would be insufficient not because such a deposition
is "inadmissible" for purposes of summary judgment, but because it fails to
show a "genuine issue" as to the material fact of exposure.
C. The Interpretive Approach: A Summary
The subparts above illustrate how Celotex is best read in light of the
interpretive values I have described. This subpart combines these insights and
describes the approach to summary judgment that is most consistent with these
values. It then explains how summary judgment would operate under this
approach.
A defendant who seeks summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff
will lack sufficient evidence to prove her case at trial must be able to point to
314. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
315. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (providing that a deposition "may be used against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice
thereof").
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some Rule 56(c) document that would be expected to contain an identification
or description of evidence that the plaintiff could use at trial, but does not.
Celotex provides a perfect example of this scenario. Celotex served
interrogatories asking the plaintiff not only for an identification of potential
witnesses supporting her claim, but also for information about any work Mr.
Catrett did with asbestos, including the identity of any specific asbestos product
he used.316 When answers to such interrogatories fail to identify any such
witnesses or information, the defendant can argue that these answers show that
there is an absence of evidence to support the plaintiff's claim. And when such
a Rule 56(c) document does point to evidence that would support the plaintiffs
claim, the defendant could use other Rule 56(c) documents to demonstrate that
such evidence will in fact be insufficient to meet the plaintiff's burden. The
defendant could, for example, obtain affidavits from or take depositions of the
witnesses identified by the plaintiff.
When the defendant is able to present Rule 56(c) documents that establish
an absence of evidence in this way, it meets its burden. The defendant does not
have to cull through the record to determine if other information indicates that
evidence may exist to support the plaintiffs claim. Nor, however, may the
defendant satisfy its burden simply by pointing to some or even all of the Rule
56(c) materials created up to that point in the litigation and asserting that they
do not contain evidence to support a particular element of the plaintiff s claim.
That is why Kress could not prevail on an absence-of-evidence theory, even
though it deposed Adickes and she could provide no first-hand testimony that a
police officer was in the store.317 While such a deposition is a Rule 56(c)
document, it does not "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact" unless there is also a Rule 56(c) document indicating that this would be
the evidence on which the plaintiff would rely to establish that fact at trial.318
If the defendant meets its burden, then courts should grant summary
judgment unless the plaintiff is able to meet her burden. 319 Under Celotex, she
316. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Catrett 11), 826 F.2d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (noting that Celotex asked for the "type and identity of each such asbestos material with
which [Mr. Catretti had contact"), on remand from Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986).
317. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970) ("Because [Kress] did
not meet its burden of establishing the absence of a policeman in the store, [Adickes] was not
required to come forward with suitable opposing affidavits.").
318. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A defendant would always have the option, of course, to seek
summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence that a condition necessary for plaintiff to
prevail is false. If Kress, for example, had provided affidavits of the police officers that denied
being in the store, it could have met its burden that way. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160.
319. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (describing the plaintiff's burden). If
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must make "a sufficient showing" with respect to the aspect of her claim that
the defendant has challenged.320 Her supporting materials must be sufficient to
carry her burden of proof at trial "if reduced to admissible evidence."
321
Assuming that the plaintiff has such materials, she faces a problem at the very
outset: The plaintiff may have to excuse her failure to reveal this information
in response to the defendant's discovery requests. The rules would require her
to demonstrate "substantial justification" for failing "seasonably to amend" her
earlier response.322 Assuming that she can provide such justification, then the
material she presents in support of her motion will be the functional equivalent
of a supplement to the Rule 56(c) document that formed the basis of the
defendant's summary judgment motion in the first place.323 If, as in Celotex,
the defendant based its motion on an interrogatory answer, then the plaintiff s
new information is tantamount to a supplemental interrogatory answer and so
may be considered to determine whether the Rule 56(c) materials "show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
3 24
Thus, when a defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis that there is
an absence of evidence, the plaintiff does not have to produce trial-quality
evidence such as an affidavit from a witness who would be competent to testify
at trial or deposition testimony that itself would be admissible at trial. She
does, however, need to provide material sufficient to refute the absence of
evidence indicated by the defendant's showing. If, for example, the defendant
had asked her to identify supporting witnesses and she failed to do so, then her
responsive material must identify such witnesses. And she must also justify her
failure to disclose that information earlier, or else she may be prevented from
using that information under the discovery rules. 325 In the event that the
plaintiff is not able to provide a sufficient response regarding the evidence she
the defendant is unable to meet this burden, of course, then summary judgment should be
denied. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 159-60 (noting that Kress's failure to show that there was no
policeman in the store required the Court to reverse the grant of summary judgment and stating
that Adickes was not thereafter required to produce opposing affidavits).
320. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
321. Id. at 327.
322. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) (describing a party's duty to amend prior discovery
responses); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (stating the penalties for failure to amend a prior discovery
response).
323. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (discussing Rules 26(e)(2) and
37(c)(1) and concluding that as long as the plaintiff justifies her failure to amend earlier
answers, such materials can be treated like Rule 56(c) materials for purposes of summary
judgment).
324. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c); see also supra note 301 and accompanying text (explaining why
it is reasonable to treat supplemental answers as equivalent to Rule 56(c) materials).
325. See supra note 293-94 and accompanying text (explaining Rule 37(c)(1)).
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could use to support her claim at trial, then she may urge the court, under Rule
56(f), to allow her more time for discovery and investigation.326
Under this Article's approach, the defendant will usually have to do some
legwork if it wants to obtain summary judgment on an "absence of evidence"
theory. For example, the defendant could use interrogatories to elicit an
identification or description of the evidence and witnesses that may support the
plaintiff's claim. When the plaintiff fails to do so, that alone would show an
absence of evidence. A defendant might also meet its burden by pointing to
plaintiff's failure to identify witnesses or evidence as part of her Rule 26(a)(1)
disclosures. 32 7 When the plaintiff does provide information about possible
witnesses and evidence, the defendant may either (a) seek summary judgment
on the basis that the plaintiffs own response indicates that her evidence will be
insufficient to carry her burden at trial,328 or (b) seek to create other Rule 56(c)
documents showing that the evidence will be insufficient, for example, by
taking depositions or obtaining affidavits of the witnesses plaintiff identified.
While this Article's approach imposes more of a burden on the defendant
than the paper trial myth,329 it also facilitates the discovery process by giving
the plaintiff a strong incentive to provide complete information in its
disclosures and discovery responses. If she delays, she would give the
defendant a basis for seeking summary judgment and would run the risk that
the court would not allow previously undisclosed information to be used in
326. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(0:
Should it appear that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had.
Id.
327. Although Rule 56(c) does not expressly mention disclosures, the initial disclosures
required by Rule 26(a) are commonly viewed as identical to interrogatories. Indeed, the Rules
Advisory Committee called them "the functional equivalent of court-ordered interrogatories."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993 amendment). Thus, Rule 56(c)'s reference
to interrogatories is sensibly read to allow consideration of Rule 26(a) disclosures.
328. Imagine, for example, that Kress had served interrogatories on Adickes asking her to
identify and describe the evidence and witnesses supporting her conspiracy claim. If Adickes
had identified only her student Carolyn and described her testimony as being that there was an
officer in the store, Kress might have argued for summary judgment on the theory that the mere
presence of an officer in the store would not be sufficient to infer a conspiracy. See supra notes
277-81 and accompanying text (discussing how Kress might have discharged its burden in
hypothetical situations).
329. See supra notes 183-86 (explaining that under the paper trial myth, a defendant can
meet its initial summary judgment burden by pointing out that the plaintiff has provided no
evidence of one or more essential elements of its claim).
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opposition. 33 Unlike the dissenters' myth, 331 however, this Article's approach
would not impose on the defendant the burden of culling through every piece of
material that has changed hands during discovery before seeking summary
judgment. 332 Once the defendant is able to meet its burden, it would be up to
the plaintiff to present materials supporting her claim (whether or not those
materials are already "in the record '' 333) and to justify her failure to disclose or
describe those materials earlier.
D. Solving the Paradox of Justice White's Concurrence
My reading of the Celotex majority opinion also solves a long-standing
riddle. Although Justice White joined the majority opinion, many view his
concurrence as endorsing a very different view of summary judgment.334 Some
have gone so far as to label Justice Rehnquist's opinion a mere "plurality,"
apparently viewing Justice White's concurrence as so incongruous with
Rehnquist's approach that White's critical fifth vote should be disregarded.335
In particular, many struggle to reconcile the Rehnquist opinion with White's
statements that a defendant cannot simply "move for summary judgment
without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that
the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case," and that the plaintiff "need
not... depose his witnesses or obtain their affidavits to defeat a summary
judgment motion asserting only that he has failed to produce any support for his
330. See supra notes 297-99 (detailing the risk that a plaintiff creates by delaying her
discovery disclosures).
331. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text (noting that under the dissenters'
myth, a defendant seeking to show an absence of evidence must show the inadequacy of any
documents or potential witnesses "in the record," even if those materials are hearsay, unswom
statements, or unauthorized documents).
332. Jack Friedenthal has criticized this apparent consequence of Justice Brennan's
approach. See Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 778 ("Must the moving party comb through all the
material available to see if there is something to be refuted even though the responding party has
never mentioned it in answers to interrogatories requesting relevant evidence?").
333. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
334. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 8, at 1344-45 (stating that Justice White rejected a
standard under which movants would have no greater burden on summary judgment than they
would have at trial, even though the majority opinion he joined appeared to adopt such a
standard).
335. See supra note 131 (noting that some scholars argue that Justice Rehnquist's opinion
was a plurality because of Justice White's separate concurrence).
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case."336 They find White's view to be more consistent with Justice Brennan's
dissent than with the Rehnquist opinion.
337
On closer analysis, the paradox of Justice White's concurrence is simply
another symptom of the paper trial myth. If one reads the majority opinion as
imposing on the plaintiff the burden of producing trial-quality evidence just as
she would at trial, then Justice White's concurrence is irreconcilable with the
majority opinion that he joined. But for the reasons set forth above, the paper
trial myth is not the best reading of the Celotex majority opinion.338 The best
interpretation is that a defendant moving for summary judgment on an absence-
of-evidence theory must be able to present a Rule 56(c) document that it would
expect to reveal evidence that the plaintiff could use at trial but does not.
339
This view fits quite nicely with Justice White's understanding that the
defendant must still "discharge the burden the Rules place upon him: It is not
enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any
way."4°
Rendering the majority opinion to be consistent with Justice White's
concurrence was not one of the interpretive values that animated this Article's
analysis. Indeed, such a value would be controversial as a principle of
interpretation. As Justice Blackmun wrote, "the meaning of a majority opinion
is to be found within the opinion itself; the gloss that an individual Justice
chooses to place upon it is not authoritative. "34 1 This Article's interpretation of
Celotex is based on the majority opinion itself, along with standard legal
referents such as past Supreme Court decisions and the governing textual
sources. It is a pleasant surprise, however, that this interpretation also
reconciles the majority opinion with Justice White's concurrence.
E. Response to Likely Critiques
This subpart considers possible criticisms of my interpretation of Celotex.
It considers three such critiques: (1) this approach is inconsistent with the text
of Rule 56(e); (2) this approach would increase the likelihood of abuse by
336. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
337. E.g., Nelken, supra note 8, at 68 (noting that both Justice White's and Justice
Brennan's opinions emphasized that the initial burden in "absence of evidence" cases is not
illusory and made clear that the party relying on the lack of evidence must pursue "leads
obtained in discovery").
338. See supra Part V.A (explaining and critiquing the paper trial myth).
339. See supra Part VI.C (presenting a better interpretation of Celotex).
340. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
341. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,448 n.3 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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litigants; and (3) this approach would prevent courts from reaching the merits
of summary judgment motions by imposing artificial burdens on moving
defendants. The first would challenge this approach from an interpretive
standpoint, and the latter two would take issue with its practical consequences.
1. Inconsistent with Rule 56(e)
Opponents of this Article's interpretation might voice a textual objection.
Recall Rule 56(e)'s instruction that when a summary judgment motion "is made
and supported as provided in this rule," the responding party "must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. '' 42 One could
argue that by requiring "specific facts," Rule 56(e) intended to require trial-
quality evidence, not simply the identification or description of such evidence.
At best, this is one plausible interpretation of an ambiguous provision.
The more persuasive reading, however, supports my view. First, a coherent
reading of this text must also account for the language used in the first half of
Rule 56(e), which requires that affidavits "shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. 343 The drafters knew what language to use when they wanted to
require trial-quality evidence. For affidavits, the drafters imposed explicit
requirements of personal knowledge, competence, and the ability to be admitted
at trial if that testimony were provided live. But when describing the general
burden to be imposed on nonmovants, the drafters required only "specific
facts." Juxtaposed against the language used to define the admissibility of
affidavits, the "specific facts" requirement can hardly be read to require trial-
quality evidence in all circumstances.
In addition, the full statement of what Rule 56(e) requires of a nonmoving
plaintiff includes "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. 344 Thus, Rule 56(e) is tied to Rule 56(c)'s requirement that summary
judgment be entered when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact. "
345
As already discussed, the best reading of Celotex from an interpretive
standpoint is that a defendant seeking summaryjudgment based on an "absence
of evidence" fails to meet its burden if Rule 56(c) materials or their equivalents
show evidence that the plaintiff might use at trial, regardless of whether those
342. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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materials are in trial-quality form. 346 It follows that such materials present
sufficiently "specific facts" to "show[] that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"37
2. Likelihood of Abuse by Litigants
One might argue that this Article's reading of Celotex would be
susceptible to abuse, both by plaintiffs and defendants. Imagine that in
response to Celotex' s interrogatories, Catrett listed a hundred people whom she
claimed had knowledge of Mr. Catrett's use of Celotex's asbestos products and
whom she planned to call at trial. Under this Article's approach, this would
effectively preclude summary judgment on an absence-of-evidence theory
unless the defendant takes affidavits or depositions of these witnesses. Imagine
that Celotex deposed the first three witnesses on the list, and they all testified
that they had never worked for Anning & Johnson, had no idea who Mr. Catrett
is, and knew nothing about working with asbestos. Can Celotex seek summary
judgment in this situation, or must it first depose the remaining ninety-seven
employees?
As an initial matter, Rule 2 6(g) should adequately deter any plaintiff
considering this strategy, because it authorizes sanctions where a party's
discovery responses are made without "a reasonable inquiry" or are "interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. 3 48 But even so, the trial court would
have the authority to police such abusive behavior under Rule 16, demanding
under circumstances like this that the plaintiff present something more akin to
trial-quality evidence.349
In any event, a defendant can improve its position by seeking via
discovery not only the identity of witnesses, but also a description of what the
plaintiff anticipates their testimony will be. If the description provided in
response appears to be inadequate-for example, it fails to indicate that the key
witness has personal knowledge of the relevant facts-then that alone could be
a basis for seeking summary judgment. If the plaintiff simply tailors her
descriptions to avoid summary judgment without conducting a reasonable
346. See supra Part V.C (arguing that the plaintiff is not required to produce trial-quality
evidence, but need only provide material sufficient to refute the absence of evidence indicated
by the defendant's showing).
347. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
348. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2).
349. See Miller, supra note 12, at 1006 & nn.120-31 (discussing the use of FED. R. Civ. P.
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inquiry, and this tactic is exposed during the discovery process, the defendant
will be in an even stronger position to seek sanctions under Rule 26(g) or other
action under Rule 16.
One could also imagine defendants behaving abusively under this
Article's approach. Unlike the dissenters' myth, this approach would permit a
defendant to meet its burden when particular Rule 56(c) documents
demonstrate an absence of evidence, even if other information revealed during
the course of discovery indicates that such evidence might exist. Does this
mean that the defendant can harass the plaintiff by deliberately ignoring new
materials and seeking summary judgment anyway?
As other scholars have noted, Rule 11 allows sanctions when the
defendant files a summary judgment motion "for any improper purpose, such as
to harass. 3 50  In any event, this Article's approach would not permit a
defendant to obtain summary judgment simply by deliberately ignoring
potential sources of evidence in the record. Those other materials are simply
assessed in connection with the plaintiff's burden. And unlike the paper trial
myth, the plaintiff will be able to meet this burden in a fairly low-cost way.
Rather than being required to convert those materials into trial-quality form, she
needs only present the materials and justify why this information had not been
provided in the Rule 56(c) documents that formed the basis of the defendant's
motion.
3. Prevents Decisions on the Merits
Martin Redish argued recently that Celotex should be read to impose
virtually no burden on a defendant moving for summary judgment.351 He drew
a distinction between "external" and "internal" barriers to summary
352judgment. External barriers are "procedural restraints on a trial court's
ability to reach the merits of a summary judgment motion. 3 53 The internal
350. FED. R. Civ. P. I l(b)(1); see also Redish, supra note 8, at 1346 (noting that Rule 11
requires parties to certify that a claim is not submitted for harassment or other improper
purposes); Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 776 ("If one party could, merely by filing an
unsupported motion, force an opponent to make a substantial showing, there would be a strong
incentive to make such a filing if for no other reason than to harass the other party and raise its
costs of litigation.").
351. See Redish, supra note 8, at 1345 (noting that the majority of lower federal courts
have wisely interpreted the decision in this way).
352. See id. at 1331 (stating his conclusions regarding the "external" and "internal" barriers
to summary judgment determinations).
353. Id. at 1331; see also id. at 1349 ("'External' barriers, as I define them, are those that
prevent the court from even reaching the substantive merits of a summary judgment motion.").
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barrier is "the standard for decision that a trial court employs once it finally
reaches the merits," 354 namely, the plaintiff s obligation to "produce evidence
sufficient to convince a rational factfinder... that the facts are as she has
alleged, and that under the controlling law and those facts she is entitled to
relief."355
Redish criticized Adickes as imposing an unjustified external barrier to
356considering the merits of a summary judgment motion. He directed the same
argument toward Justice Brennan, Martin Louis, and Melissa Nelken,357 who
had argued that a defendant must make reasonable discovery efforts in order to
meet its burden under an absence-of-evidence theory.358 It begs the question,
however, to assert that imposing such a burden on a defendant prevents a court
from considering "the merits" of a summary judgment motion. According to
Rule 56, the merits inquiry for a summary judgment motion is whether the Rule
56(c) documents "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."35 9
For the reasons set forth earlier, this does not necessarily transform summary
judgment into a paper trial, in which a lack of supporting evidence
automatically means that the plaintiff loses. 360 To the contrary, the best
understanding is that the movant must use Rule 56(c) documents to "show that
there is no genuine issue." Indeed, the party asking a court to take action (that
is, to grant summary judgment) typically bears the burden of convincing the
court that such action is appropriate.36'
354. Id. at 1331.
355. Id. at 1349.
356. See id. at 1342-43 ("Because of the artificial barrier to consideration of the merits of
Kress's summary judgment motion imposed by the Adickes Court, however, the trial court was
unable even to 'peek behind the curtain' to determine exactly what evidence Adickes planned to
rely on to establish this essential portion of her case.").
357. Id. at 1347-48 (responding to Justice Brennan, Louis, and Nelken with the
observation that "[t]he key point that all of the detractors of Celotex seem to ignore is that use of
the procedure set out in Adickes effectively results in a denial of a motion for summary
judgment without a court's ever making an inquiry into the actual merits of that motion").
358. See id. at 1347 (explaining their approach); see also Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 776
(questioning an approach to summary judgment that would "shift the entire inquiry from the
fundamental question of whether the responding party could possibly meet its burden of proof at
trial to the technical, irrelevant question of whether the moving party has met a contrived burden
for summary judgment").
359. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
360. See supra notes 191-203 (critiquing the paper trial approach).
361. There are rare exceptions to this principle. For example, a party asserting that a
federal court has subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction,
even if she is not the movant. Thus, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction even when she is opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss, e.g., Osborn v.
United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1990), and a defendant bears the burden of
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The facts of Adickes confirm that a lack of trial-quality evidence in the
summary judgment record does not necessarily mean a lack of evidence at trial.
Redish criticized the Adickes decision because:
If Adickes presented absolutely no admissible evidence to support her essential
claim of a conspiracy between Kress and the policemen, Kress--with or without
its own affirmative supporting evidence-could have immediately moved for
directed verdict, simply pointing out the obvious--the lack of any supporting
evidence-and the motion would undoubtedly have been granted.
362
This is an excellent observation, one that echoes David Currie's pre-Celotex
response to the Adickes decision.363 But this view mistakenly presumes that the
materials Adickes presented in opposing summary judgment were "exactly [the]
evidence Adickes planned to rely on" at trial.364 Recall that Adickes testified in her
deposition that her student Carolyn Moncure had seen a police officer in the store.
365
And in that case, we need not speculate whether the student could so testify or
whether Adickes could or planned to call her as a witness. Carolyn Moncure did
testify at the trial on Adickes' s custom of the community claim (which had survived
summaryjudgment), and she testified that there had been a police officer in the store
that day.36 While one might fault Adickes for not obtaining an affidavit from her
student at the summary judgment phase, that overlooks fundamental questions that
are central, not peripheral, to "the merits": When is the plaintiff obligated to
disclose what her evidence will be? And what form must that disclosure take?
That said, Martin Redish is absolutely correct that an evaluation of summary
judgment burdens from a policy standpoint must consider the risk "of [an]
unnecessary trial that summary judgment was created to avoid. ' ' 67 But no approach
to summary judgment can eliminate this risk entirely, not even a requirement that
the plaintiff produce trial-quality evidence in order to survive summary judgment. It
is possible, for example, that the witness on whose affidavit the plaintiff relied to
establishing subject matter jurisdiction even when it is opposing the plaintiff's motion to
remand, e.g., Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). But there appears no
reason to create such an exception for summary judgment motions. To the contrary, some have
read Rule 56(c)'s requirement that the documents "show that there is no genuine issue" as itself
"requir[ing] an initial showing by the moving party." Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 775.
362. Redish, supra note 8, at 1343.
363. See Currie, supra note 159, at 77-79 (critiquing the Adickes decision and the
ambiguity of Rule 56(c)).
364. Redish, supra note 8, at 1343.
365. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 156 n.13 (1970).
366. Id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 234 n.22 (suggesting that in Adickes, "the
Supreme Court was put in a position where it virtually was compelled to reverse because
evidence sufficient to sustain count two had been admitted at trial").
367. Redish, supra note 8, at 1347-48.
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avoid summary judgment would give different testimony at trial, or not show up at
all. Efforts to reduce the risk of unnecessary trials must therefore be balanced
against other considerations. 368 Allowing defendants to file burden-free summary
judgment motions can be costly and unfair to plaintiffs. 369 And given that in most
cases it is in the defendant's strategic interest to use discovery to obtain a preview of
the plaintiff s case, requiring defendants to do some legwork is not likely to impose
costs that they would not incur willingly.
VII. Conclusion
While the Celotex decision has been the subject of substantial debate and
disagreement within the academy and the judiciary, it has yet to be truly interpreted.
Rather, the competing approaches to Celotex emphasize the policy consequences of
alternative readings without considering traditional interpretive values such as
consistency with prior precedent, consistency with textual sources, and internal
coherence. By taking these values seriously, this Article's reading of Celotex
provides cogent answers to the decision's many ambiguities and offers a reasonable
middle ground between the two dominant myths of Celotex.
VIII. Appendix
The citation counts in the tables below and elsewhere in this Article are based
on the number of citations recorded by the Shepard's citation service as of June 29,
2005. Table 1 lists the top fifteen decisions in terms of federal citations. More
federal courts and tribunals have cited these fifteen decisions than any others. Table
2 lists the top thirty cases in terms of federal and state citations. More courts and
tribunals (federal and state) have cited these decisions than any others.37 °
Not surprisingly, nearly all of the decisions qualifying to appear on these tables
are from the United States Supreme Court. There are four exceptions: three
decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and a Third Circuit
368. See Miller, supra note 12, at 1048 (questioning whether "promoting use of summary
judgment may be offset by negative effects on other system values, such as accuracy, fairness,
the day-in-court principle, and the jury trial right").
369. See Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 777 (noting the painstaking process of establishing
a case through circumstantial evidence and the burden placed on the responding party at the
pretrial stage); see also Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 103-05 (demonstrating
that imposing no burden on moving defendants results in "striking and unambiguous transfer of
wealth from plaintiffs to defendants").
370. Thanks to Jane Morris at Lexis-Nexis for providing citation count information for this
Article.
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decision on a petition for review of an NLRB ruling.371 The high citation counts for
these four decisions are due to frequent citations by the NLRB.
37 2
Table 1: Most Frequently Cited by Federal Courts and Tribunals
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) 72,887
2 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) 70,041
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 31,674
475 U.S. 574 (1986)
4 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) 28,335
5 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) 26,025
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 19,007
7 Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) 16,225
8 Woolworth, F. W., Co. (Cincinnati, Ohio), 90 N.L.R.B. 289 16,165(1950)
9 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 12,374
10 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) 11,855
11 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 10,724
12 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) 10,719
13 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) 10,558
14 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) 10,341
15 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) 10,203
371. Woolworth, F. W., Co. (Cincinnati, Ohio), 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950); Standard Dry
Wall Prods., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 544 (1950); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716
(1962); Standard Dry Wall Prods., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
372. For each of these four decisions, citations by the N.L.R.B. comprise more than 99% of
the total citations.
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Table 2: Most Frequently Cited By All Courts and Tribunals
Anaerson v. uierty LoDDy, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986) 72,887 1,622 74,509
2 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) 70,041 2,903 72,944
Strickland v. Washington, 19,007 33,314 52,321
466 U.S. 668 (1984) 1,7 34 5 2
4 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) 9,871 32,886 42,757
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 8,314 25,802 34,116
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
6 Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) 31,674 383 32,057
7 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) 6,810 23,064 29,874
8 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) 28,335 1,208 29,543
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 26,025 2,161 28,186
792 (1973) 26,025 2,161 28,186
10 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 5,880 15,084 20,964
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 16,225 1,167 17,392
U.S. 248 (1981) 1,5 16 73
12 Woolworth, F. W., Co. (Cincinnati, Ohio), 90 16,165 8 16,173N.L.R.B. 289 (1950) 16158 1,7
13 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 7,559 7,960 15,519
14 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) 4,476 9,669 14,145
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 12,374 1,103 13,477
15 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 1,7 ,03 ,4
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 11,855 355 12,210
16 398 U.S. 144 (1970)
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 7,461 4,305 11,766
17 326 U.S. 310 (1945) 741 ,0 1,6
18 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) 10,719 911 11,630
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